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ARTICLES
Access to Justice, Rationality,
and Personal Jurisdiction
*

Adam N. Steinman

After more than twenty years of silence, the Supreme Court has
addressed personaljurisdiction six times over the last six Terms. This
Article examines the Court's recent decisions in terms of their effect on
access to justice and the enforcement of substantive law. The Court's new
case law has unquestionably made it harder to establish general
jurisdiction-thatis, the kind of jurisdiction that requires no affiliation
at all between the forum state and the litigation. Although this shift has
been justifiably criticized, meaningful access and enforcement can be
preserved through other aspects of the jurisdictionalframework, namely
(1) the basic level of minimum contacts requiredfor specific jurisdiction,
and (2) the test for determining whether a case can proceed on a specific

*
University Research Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to
Carol Andrews, Beth Burch, Jenny Carroll, Shahar Dillbary, Robin Effron, Helen Hershkoff, Ron
Krotoszynski, Alexi Lahav, Arthur Miller, Jonathan Nash, Teddy Rave, Caprice Roberts, and Ben
Spencer for their helpful comments and suggestions. This Article also benefitted from discussions
with participants in Faculty Colloquia at the University of Alabama School of Law and the
University of Georgia School of Law, and in the Remedies Discussion Forum at Aix-Marseille
University. Finally, thanks to Francisco Escobar-Calderon and Xeris Gregory for excellent
research assistance and to the editors and staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review for their wonderful
editorial work on this article.

1401

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1402

[Vol. 71:5:1401

jurisdiction theory rather than having to satisfy the newly restrictive
generaljurisdictionstandard.
This Article begins with a typology that identifies three situations
where personaljurisdiction is most likely to threaten access to justice:
the home-state scenario, the safety-net scenario, and the aggregation
scenario. It then explains why the Court's recent decisions support an
approach to minimum contacts that will-in most cases-permit a
plaintiff who is injured in his or her home state to file suit there. Even
beyond the home-state scenario, a case should be evaluated under the
more lenient specific jurisdictionstandardas long as there is a rational
basis for the forum to adjudicatethe availabilityof judicial remedies in
that particularcase. This rationalitystandardcoheres with the Court's
approach to other areas of law governing the permissible reach of a
state's sovereign power. And it can permit jurisdictionwhen other courts
are inadequate or unavailable (the safety-net scenario) and when
proceeding in a single forum is necessary for effective adjudication of
claims arising from a common course of conduct (the aggregation
scenario).
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INTRODUCTION

Personal jurisdiction is once again on the Supreme Court's front
burner. After more than two decades of silence on the subject, the Court
has decided six personal jurisdiction cases in a six-year period.'
Although scholars have devoted considerable attention to personal
jurisdiction over the years, 2 the Court's newfound interest makes it
particularly timely to examine what the new cases have (and have not)
changed as a doctrinal matter, and to confront broader questions about
why personal jurisdiction matters.
In all six of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, the Court
found that asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant violated
the Due Process Clause. But it does not necessarily follow that the new
cases have changed the overarching jurisdictional rules in ways that
will undermine access to judicial remedies and the enforcement of
substantive law. This Article's goal is twofold: first, to identify with
greater precision the practical effect of the Court's recent decisions on
1.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011);
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§

1067.1 (4th ed. 2015

&

& Supp. 2018) (summarizing the Court's six recent decisions).
2.
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction,101 HARv. L. REV.
1444 (1988); William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdictionand Aliens, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1205 (2018); Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction,60 EMORY L.J. 1 (2010); Harold L. Korn,
Rethinking PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2183 (1997); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdictionover Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85
(1983); Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward A Mixed Theory of
PersonalJurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189 (1998); Wendy Collins Perdue, PersonalJurisdictionand
the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529 (1991); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum
Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202 (2011); John F. Preis, The
Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on Personal Jurisdiction, 102 IowA L. REV. 121 (2016);
Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward
A New Equilibriumin PersonalJurisdiction,48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207 (2014); George Rutherglen,
International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 347; Stephen E. Sachs,
Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate:
A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (2006); Allan R. Stein, Styles ofArgument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of PersonalJurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987); Alan M. Trammell
Derek E. Bambauer, PersonalJurisdictionand the "Interwebs,"100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129 (2015);
Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988); Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121 (1966); Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudenceof Jurisdiction,58
S. CALIF. L. REV. 913 (1985); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial
Jurisdiction:Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169 (2004).
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access to justice, and second, to develop a way forward that addresses
these concerns and coherently situates the various aspects of the
Court's jurisdictional doctrine.
The fundamental constitutional standard for evaluating
personal jurisdiction still derives from the Supreme Court's
"pathmarking" 1945 decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington:3
a defendant must have "minimum contacts" with the forum state such
that the suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' "4 During the latter half of the twentieth century,
however, a more complex doctrinal structure evolved, under which a
defendant's minimum contacts with the forum are not necessarily
sufficient. 5 A court may need to assess whether the case falls within
"specific jurisdiction" or "general jurisdiction."6 Specific jurisdiction,
which applies only when there is an "affiliation" between the forum and
the underlying litigation, can be satisfied with mere "minimum"
contacts. 7 General jurisdiction, which subjects a defendant to any and
all claims, requires much more than minimum contacts.8 In addition, a
court may need to inquire whether jurisdiction would be "reasonable"which might foreclose jurisdiction even if the requisite amount of
contacts exist. 9
In terms of the black-letter jurisdictional principles, the
Supreme Court's new cases have provided little guidance regarding the
basic minimum contacts threshold. The two most recent cases where
the defendant's lack of minimum contacts was dispositive were
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastroo and Walden v. Fiore.1 1 Both
decisions, however, hinged on unique aspects of the facts and records in
those cases, and they left prior case law undisturbed. 12

326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1785 (Sotomayor, J.,
3.
dissenting) (describing InternationalShoe as "pathmarking"); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (same);
McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 893 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same).
4.
Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
See infra Section I.A.
5.
6.
See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
7.
See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 42-43 (describing the requirement that a defendant must have
8.
"continuous and systematic contacts" with the forum state to be subject to general jurisdiction).
9.
See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. As discussed infra note 63 and
accompanying text, the Supreme Court's recent case law instructs that this separate
reasonableness inquiry is required only for specific jurisdiction.
10. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
11. 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
12. See infra Part III.
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For other parts of the jurisdictional framework, the Court has
done significantly more. The most notable change has been with respect
to the contacts required to establish general jurisdiction. Previously,
state and federal courts would often find general jurisdiction over
defendants simply because they made significant sales to the forum or
had significant operations in the forum. 13 More recently, beginning with
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court has
instructed that defendants are subject to general jurisdiction only when
their contacts are "so continuous and systematic as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State." 14 In applying this standard, the
Court's current case law has rejected general jurisdiction even when
defendants have a substantial physical presence in the forum state.'1
The only locations that are reliable venues for general jurisdiction are
a corporate defendant's principal place of business and its state of
incorporation and an individual defendant's domicile. 16
Although the Court's initial embrace of the "essentially at home"
standard for general jurisdiction was unanimous, its subsequent
applications of that standard have not been. In DaimlerAG v.
Bauman17 and BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,18 Justice Sotomayor
disagreed sharply with the Court's approach. 19 She has written alone
on these issues, however. Other Justices-including ones who typically
would favor greater access for plaintiffs-have joined in the Court's
restriction of general jurisdiction. 20 One explanation may be that,
standing alone, narrowing general jurisdiction does not necessarily
undermine access to justice. 2 1 Appreciating the distinct ways that
personal jurisdiction relates to access and enforcement demonstrates
why this is so.
Consider first what might be called the home-state scenario: a
plaintiff is injured in her home state, relevant events occur in her home
state, and she seeks remedies from an out-of-state defendant in the
courts of her home state. Denying personal jurisdiction in this situation
13. See 4A WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supranote 1, § 1069.2, at 197-204.
14. 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (citing the Court's decisions in Goodyear,
Daimler, and BNSF).
16. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (noting that these venues are "paradigm
bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction").
17. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
18. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
19. Id. at 1560-62 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Daimler, 571
U.S. at 146 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
20. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
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not only flouts strong state interests but also can create inordinate
burdens on in-state plaintiffs. 22 Here, however, personal jurisdiction
does not depend on general jurisdiction. Because an affiliation between
the forum and the underlying controversy clearly exists, a sensible
approach to minimum contacts in the specific jurisdiction context will
usually allow plaintiffs to sue in their home state when they are injured
there. 2 3
Two other situations, however, require a direct reckoning with
other layers of the doctrinal framework. One is the safety-net scenario,
where legal systems with stronger grounds for asserting personal
jurisdiction over the defendant are unavailable or inadequate. Denying
personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts can leave parties with no viable
forum for asserting their substantive rights-including rights created
by international law. 2 4 Another is the aggregation scenario, where
multiple parties are involved in litigation arising from a common course
of conduct. Denying personal jurisdiction can block the efficient
aggregation of claims and may make it economically impossible to hold
defendants accountable when the costs of individual lawsuits would
exceed the likely individual recovery. 25 Prior to the Supreme Court's
recent decisions, courts could often rely on general jurisdiction in these
situations. The Court's narrowing of general jurisdiction, however,
threatens to create an access-to-justice blind spot.
Informed by these areas of concern, this Article makes two
arguments. First, it argues that the Court's recent case law does not
mandate a more restrictive approach to the basic minimum contacts
standard. A close reading of the McIntyre and Walden decisions shows
that they should not be understood to create significant obstacles in
most situations where a plaintiff sues in his or her home state based on
events occurring there. When a defendant is benefiting from markets in
the forum state, or has otherwise reached out to that state through its
activities, it has established the requisite minimum contacts. 26
Second, this Article develops a theory to guide what has become
a particularly crucial feature of the doctrinal framework: the line
between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. The Court's most
recent decision-Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court2 7 -iS the
22. See infra Section II.A.
23. Jurisdiction will not always be permissible, however-at least not as to every possible
defendant. See infra notes 253-256, 277-278 and accompanying text (discussing examples).
24. See infra Section 1I.B.
25. See infra Section II.C.
26. See infra Part III.
27. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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first Supreme Court case in which the parties directly contested
whether the specific jurisdiction or the general jurisdiction standard
applied. 28 But the Bristol-Myers decision failed to provide a broader
theory for what sort of "affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy" 29 is sufficient to avoid the Court's newly
restrictive requirements for general jurisdiction.
This Article argues that rationality is the appropriate
touchstone: a case may proceed as a specific jurisdiction case as long as
there is a rational basis for the courts of the forum state to adjudicate
the availability of the requested remedies against the defendant in that
particular litigation. This rationality standard coheres with the
Supreme Court's approach to other areas of law where the permissible
reach of a state's sovereign power is tested-such as the constitutional
constraints on choice of law. It also fits with the Court's more general
due process jurisprudence, which uses a rational basis standard when
reviewing most forms of government action (such as laws that do not
target fundamental rights). 30 More functionally, this proposal solves
the safety-net and aggregation problems. It is only when no rational,
dispute-related justification exists that the high threshold required for
general jurisdiction should be imposed.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the Supreme
Court's post-International Shoe jurisdictional doctrine, describing
where things stood in 1990 (before what would become a twenty-year
hiatus from personal jurisdiction) and then highlighting the
substantive changes made by the Court's recent decisions. Part II uses
three of the Court's recent decisions to illustrate three distinct ways
that personal jurisdiction doctrine can undermine access to justice and
the enforcement of substantive rights and obligations-the home-state
scenario, the safety-net scenario, and the aggregation scenario. Part III
discusses the effect of the Court's recent case law on the basic minimum
contacts standard and argues that its decisions are consistent with an
approach that will-in most cases-permit a plaintiff who is injured in
his or her home state to file suit there. Part IV proposes a rationality
standard for delineating between specific jurisdiction and general
jurisdiction and explains how that approach would address the access-

28. In one earlier case on this question, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984), the plaintiffs conceded that the case should be evaluated under a general
jurisdiction standard. See infra note 68.
29. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 267-271 and accompanying text.
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to-justice concerns that arise in the safety-net and aggregation
scenarios.
I. SEVEN DECADES OF INTERNATIONAL SHOE

This Part summarizes the personal jurisdiction framework that
has evolved since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.3 1 Section A describes its first
forty-five years, emphasizing the doctrinal structure that crystallized
during a particularly intense period of Supreme Court activity in the
1980s. Section B addresses the Court's rather remarkable twenty-year
hiatus from personal jurisdiction, which was followed by the current
run of six decisions in six years. Section C clarifies some additional
considerations regarding state statutory law and the scope of personal
jurisdiction in federal court, but explains why the most significant
aspect of the Supreme Court's case law continues to be the
constitutional constraints on state courts.
A. International Shoe's First Forty-Five Years
The Supreme Court's 1945 decision in International Shoe
revolutionized the constitutional contours of personal jurisdiction. In
the decades prior to that decision, courts and legislatures struggled to
fit new social realities-such as "the nation's increasingly
industrialized economy, the advent of high speed transportation and
communication, and the mobility of the population" 32-into notions of
jurisdiction that fixated on the defendant's "presence" in the territory
of the state seeking to assert jurisdiction 33 or on the defendant's
"consent" to the jurisdiction of that state. 34
Responsive to these concerns, International Shoe articulated a
new constitutional standard. Chief Justice Harlan Stone declared that
even if a defendant is not present in the forum state, due process is
satisfied as long as the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with
[the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "35 Even in this
seminal decision, the Court recognized that the assessment of a
defendant's "contacts" with the forum state might vary depending on
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1067, at 360.
Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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whether the lawsuit itself was related to those contacts. For example,
the Court contrasted lawsuits based on "dealings entirely distinct from"
the defendant's activities in a state 36 with lawsuits based on
"obligations" that "arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state."3 7

'

In the wake of International Shoe-and with some help from
Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman-the Supreme
Court distilled this insight into a distinction between "general
jurisdiction" and "specific jurisdiction."3 8 Specific jurisdiction requires
"affiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy" 39
such as when the lawsuit "aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's
contacts with the forum." 40 General jurisdiction allows a court to hear
all claims against a defendant, regardless of whether the claims
themselves have any connection to the forum state. 41 Not surprisingly,
general jurisdiction imposes a "substantially higher threshold than is
required in specific jurisdiction cases." 42 As the Supreme Court put it,
the defendant's contacts must be "continuous and systematic." 4 3
Specific jurisdiction does not require such continuous and systematic
contacts, but it does require purposeful activity by the defendant
directed at the forum-a notion that sometimes goes by the label
"purposeful availment." 44

36. Id. at 318.
37. Id. at 319.
38. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984) (citing_
Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980
SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80-81; and von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1144-64).
39. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1136.
40. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 114464).
41. See id. at 414 n.9 ("When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to
be exercising 'general jurisdiction' over the defendant.").
42. 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1067.5, at 529.
43. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (permitting Ohio courts
to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that was "carrying on in Ohio a continuous and
systematic, but limited, part of its general business" even though "[t]he cause of action sued upon
did not arise in Ohio and does not relate to the corporation's activities there"); see also Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 416 (considering whether the defendant's contacts with the forum state "constitute the
kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins");
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984) (describing Perkins as "permitting general jurisdiction
where defendant's contacts with the forum were 'continuous and systematic' ").
44. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) ("[I]t is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
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In addition to the distinction between specific and general
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court articulated what is sometimes called
the "second prong" of the personal jurisdiction test.45 Even when a
defendant has established the requisite contacts with the forum state,
a court must inquire whether jurisdiction would be "reasonable" and
comport with "fair play and substantial justice." 46 Factors relevant to
this reasonableness inquiry include the burden on the defendant, the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies. 47
B. Twenty Years of Silence, Then a Flurry of Activity
From 1991 to 2010, the Court issued no decisions on personal
jurisdiction. The lack of interest was particularly striking given how
active the Court was from 1980 to 1990.48 It decided more than a dozen
cases on personal jurisdiction during this period, 49 and there were
45. See, e.g., Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (describing "the second prong of the traditional Due Process inquiry"); Irving v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing "the due process test's
second prong").

46. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (describing the
"fair play and substantial justice" element as requiring a "determination of the reasonableness of
the exercise of jurisdiction"); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 ("Once it has been decided that a
defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may
be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.'" (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945))).
47. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980)).
48. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that the Court's period of abstention from personal
jurisdiction followed two notable decisions decided by the early Rehnquist Court that failed to
generate majority opinions on important doctrinal questions. As discussed infra notes 196-206
and accompanying text, Asahi lacked a majority opinion on when jurisdiction is proper over a
defendant whose products reach the forum through the so-called stream of commerce. And
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), lacked a majority opinion on how to evaluate the
constitutionality of "tag" jurisdiction-where the sole basis for jurisdiction is service of process on
an individual who is temporarily present in the forum. The Roberts Court would quickly discover
how difficult it is to garner the consensus of five Justices; its first decision in this more recent run
of cases also failed to generate a majority opinion. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text
(discussing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)).
49. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 604; Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988);
Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102; Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462; United States v.
Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984);
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Underwriters Nat'l
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several instances where Justices openly dissented from the Court's
refusal to grant certiorari.SO
The hiatus ended at the beginning of the October 2010 Term,
with the Court agreeing to hear two cases on personal jurisdiction.5 1 In
June 2011-on the final day of that Term-the Court broke its silence
with decisions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro52 and
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown. 53 That was only the
beginning. The Court would hand down two personal jurisdiction
decisions in 2014,54 as well as two in 2017.55
In terms of the overarching doctrinal framework, the Court's
recent decisions have made the clearest substantive changes to general
jurisdiction. First, the Court declared-initially in Goodyear and then
in subsequent cases-that general jurisdiction requires that the
defendant's contacts be "so continuous and systematic as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State." 5 6 For an individual defendant,
"the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
individual's domicile."57 For a corporation, its state of incorporation and
principal place of business are the "paradigm bases for the exercise of
general jurisdiction."5 8 Although general jurisdiction "is not limited to
Assur. Co. v. N. Carolina Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982); City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286.
50. See, e.g., Baxter v. Mouzavires, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari, joined by Powell, J.); Chelsea House Publishers v. Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc., 455
U.S. 994 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Berger, C.J. & Powell, J.);
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Powell, J.).
51. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 561 U.S. 1058 (2010) (granting certiorari);
Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, S.A. v. Brown, 561 U.S. 1058 (2010) (granting certiorari).
52. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
53. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
54. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
55. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
56. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 126-27 (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). See
generally Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV.
L.J. 1161 (2015) (describing "the Court's unexplained move from 'continuous and systematic' to 'at
home' ").

57. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924.
58. Id. (citing Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer Haverkamp & Buck Logan, A GeneralLook at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988)). The Supreme Court has yet to specify how to
determine a corporation's principal place of business for purposes of general jurisdiction. To
determine a corporation's citizenship for purposes of the federal diversity jurisdiction statute, the
Court has clarified that a corporation's principal place of business is "the corporation's 'nerve,
center,' " which "should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquartersprovided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination." Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
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these forums,"5 9 the Court indicated that it would have to be an
"exceptional case" for a defendant to be subject to general jurisdiction
beyond these paradigms.6 0 Indeed, the Court's decisions in Daimler AG
v. Bauman and BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell rejected general
jurisdiction even when the defendant had a substantial physical
presence in the forum state. 6 1 This was a major shift. Previously, state
and federal courts would often find general jurisdiction over defendants
simply because they made significant sales to the forum or had
significant operations in the forum. 62
Second, the Court's recent decisions have clarified that the
second-prong "reasonableness" inquiry that crystallized during the
1980s does not apply in the general jurisdiction context. As long as a
defendant is "genuinely at home in the forum State," there is no need
"to consider several additional factors to assess the reasonableness of
entertaining the case." 6 3

On other aspects of the jurisdictional framework, it is hard to
identify concrete substantive changes in the Court's recent decisions.
As explained in more detail below, the Court's decisions in J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro64 and Walden v. Fiore65 hinged on the basic
minimum contacts requirement, but they were highly fact-specific and
left in place pre-existing case law. 6 6 The 2017 decision in Bristol-Myers

"

embraced the Hertz test in the context of personal jurisdiction, some lower courts have. E.g.,
Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Co. SA, 263 F. Supp. 3d 498, 503 (D. Del. 2017) ("For
jurisdictional purposes, a corporation's principal place of business is its 'nerve center ....
(quoting Hertz, 559 U.S. at 80, 97)); see also Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Jurisdiction,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1060-61 (2012) (noting that "[t]he Hertz test has no direct
application to general jurisdiction, which is a question of due process, not a question of federal
statutory subject matter jurisdiction," but arguing that "the state of a corporation's nerve center
under Hertz also should qualify as the corporation's home for purposes of general jurisdiction").
59. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1558; see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136-37 ("Goodyear did not hold
that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated
or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.").
60. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1558 ("[I]n an 'exceptional case,' a corporate defendant's operations
in another forum 'may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home
in that State.'" (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19)).
61. See infra notes 124-131 and accompanying text (discussing Daimler); see also BNSF, 137
S. Ct. at 1559 (rejecting personal jurisdiction even though "BNSF has over 2,000 miles of railroad
track and more than 2,000 employees in Montana").
62. See 4A WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1069.2, at 197-204.
63. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20; see also id. (stating that the "multipronged reasonableness
check ... articulated in Asahi" was "not ... a free-floating test" and was only "to be essayed when
specific jurisdiction is at issue" (emphasis omitted)); see also infra note 201 (discussing the role of
the reasonableness inquiry in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
64. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
65. 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
66. See infra Section III.C.
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Squibb Co. v. Superior Court67 is the first Supreme Court case where
the parties contested whether the case should be assessed under a
specific jurisdiction or a general jurisdiction standard. 68 The
Bristol-Myers decision failed, however, to provide a clarifying theory for
what drives the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction
and what should guide courts going forward. 69
C. Additional Considerations:State Statutes and Federal Courts
The constitutional doctrine described above is one aspect of the
jurisdictional analysis in any given case. There are some additional
requirements that vary depending on whether a case is.filed in state
court or in federal court, and whether there is any specialized federal
statute or federal rule authorizing personal jurisdiction.
Consider first a case that is filed in state court. For a state court,
the constitutional framework described above is a feature of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which explicitly applies
to the states. 70 Jurisdiction in any given state court must also comply
with that state's statutory requirements-sometimes called the state's

67. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
68. The only other arguable instance was HelicopterosNacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
but in that case the plaintiffs, who sued in Texas, conceded that their claims did not arise out of
and were not related to the defendant's activities in Texas, and therefore general jurisdiction was
the only viable theory. 466 U.S. 408, 415 & n.10 (1984):
All parties to the present case concede that respondents' claims against Helicol did not
'arise out of,' and are not related to, Helicol's activities within Texas.... Because the
parties have not argued any relationship between the cause of action and Helicol's
contacts with the State of Texas, we . . . assert no view with respect to that issue.
In dissent, Justice Brennan did not accept this concession, and argued that "the undisputed
contacts in this case between petitioner Helicol and the State of Texas are sufficiently important,
and sufficiently related to the underlying cause of action" to justify specific jurisdiction. Id. at 420
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants' Terms: BristolMyers Squibb and the Federalizationof Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1280 (2018)
(noting that Bristol-Myers "does not clarify what kind of a 'connection between the forum and the
specific claims at issue' specific jurisdiction requires" (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781));
see also infra notes 162-179 and accompanying text (discussing Bristol-Myers).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell,
137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) ("We therefore inquire whether the Montana courts' exercise of
personal jurisdiction under Montana law comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945) (describing the "question[ ]
for decision" as "whether, within the limitations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, appellant, a Delaware corporation, has by its activities in the State of Washington
rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of that state"). But see infra note 267 (citing
commentators critiquing the view that restrictions on personal jurisdiction are constitutionally
compelled by the Due Process Clause).
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"long-arm statute."7 1 In many states, however, the relevant statutes
provide that their courts' jurisdiction extends to the full range allowed
by the Due Process Clause. 72 And even in states with more
particularized jurisdictional statutes, state courts have often
interpreted them to reach as far as the federal Constitution will allow. 73
For cases filed in federal district court, the jurisdictional
requirements are often identical to what would apply in state court.
This is because most federal court actions are governed by the default
jurisdictional provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A),
which permits personal jurisdiction in federal court when jurisdiction
would be proper in the state where the district court is located. 74 To
comply with Rule 4(k)(1)(A), therefore, personal jurisdiction in federal
court must satisfy both the relevant state's long-arm statute and the
constitutional restrictions that would apply in state court via the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 5
Sometimes, however, a federal statute or a federal rule provides
independent authorization for personal jurisdiction in a federal court. 7 6
In such cases, the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction in federal

71. E.g., Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 23 N.E.3d 988, 992-96 (N.Y. 2014) (rejecting personal
jurisdiction based on New York's long-arm statute); Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221
S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007) ("Texas courts may assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
if (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of
jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due-process guarantees.").
72. See, e.g., CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2018) ("A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States."); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (West 2018) (providing that defendants "shall be subject
to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island. . . in every case not contrary to the provisions of
the constitution or laws of the United States").
73. See, e.g., LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986) (stating that
Delaware's long-arm statute "has been broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum
extent possible under the due process clause" (discussing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c))).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) ("Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes
personal jurisdiction over a defendant . .. who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located."); 4A WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN,
supra note 1, § 1069, at 124 ("[F]or constitutional purposes, a federal court proceeding under Rule
4(k)(1)(A) must assess the defendant's contacts with the forum state .... Rule 4(k)(1)(A)
authorizes personal jurisdiction in federal court only as far as would be authorized in state court.").
75. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A));
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 124-25 (2014) (same).
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (permitting personal jurisdiction "when authorized by a
federal statute"); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (permitting personal jurisdiction "[flor a claim that arises
under federal law" when "the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts" and
"exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws"); see also, e.g.,
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 175 F. Supp. 3d 3, 26 & n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2234) (recognizing that the Antiterrorism Act of 1992 authorizes personal jurisdiction); Siswanto
v. Airbus, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1697) (recognizing that
the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 authorizes personal jurisdiction).
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court is governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendmentwhich, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, applies to the federal
government.77 Although the Supreme Court has yet to address this
issue directly,7 8 a Fifth Amendment analysis is widely understood to
hinge on the defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole
rather than the particular state where the district court is located. 79 It
77. See 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1068.1, at 727; see also, e.g., Noble
Sec., Inc. v. MIZ Eng'g, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 2d 513, 552 (E.D. Va. 2009) ("Unlike the assertion of
jurisdiction under the state long-arm statute, where due process concerns are addressed under the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, assertion of jurisdiction under a federal
statute . . . requires application of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."). One
unresolved question is whether the Fourteenth or the Fifth Amendment would apply when
Congress authorizes personal jurisdiction in state courts. This argument was raised but not
decided in the BNSF case, where the plaintiffs argued that (1) section 56 of the Federal Employers
Liability Act ("FELA") created an independent basis for personal jurisdiction in any state where
an employer is "doing business," and (2) therefore the Fifth Amendment analysis would apply as
to the constitutionality of a state court exercising personal jurisdiction under that federal statute.
See Brief for Respondents at 36, BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (No. 16-405), 2017
WL 1192088, at *36 ("[A]ny due process limitations that apply to Congress's jurisdictional choices
stem not from the Fourteenth Amendment, but from the Fifth Amendment as it applies to
exercises of federal authority."). The Supreme Court found that section 56 did not authorize
personal jurisdiction, BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1553, so it had no need to address the constitutional
standard that would apply in that situation.
78. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103 n.5 (1987) (noting the
theory that "a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth
Amendment, based on an aggregation of the defendant's contacts with the Nation as a whole,
rather than on its contacts with the State in which the federal court sits" but declining "to consider
the constitutional issues raised by this theory"); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (O'Connor, J.):
We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal
jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of nationalcontacts, rather
than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court
sits.
79. See, e.g., Submersible Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 420 (5th
Cir. 2001); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2001); Siswanto, 153 F. Supp.
3d at 1028; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (subdivision
(k)) ("The Fifth Amendment requires that any defendant have affiliating contacts with the United
States sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over that party."). Although it is
generally accepted that the Fifth Amendment analyzes a defendant's contacts with the United
States as a whole rather than any particular state, there is a range of opinion regarding how to
evaluate the "reasonableness" of jurisdiction for Fifth Amendment purposes-or even whether
such an independent reasonableness inquiry is necessary. Compare, e.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444
U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that in the Fifth Amendment context there
is no need to inquire "whether it is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of litigating
in an inconvenient forum"), with Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119
F.3d 935, 947 (11th Cir. 1997):
A defendant's 'minimum contacts' with the United States do not ...
automatically
satisfy the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. There are circumstances,
although rare, in which a defendant may have sufficient contacts with the United States
as a whole but still will be unduly burdened by the assertion of jurisdiction in a faraway
and inconvenient forum.
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is generally accepted, however, that the potentially broader reach of the
Fifth Amendment can only be accessed by explicit authorizationeither an act of Congress or a rule of procedure adopted pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act.8 0
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's state-focused Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence continues to play the dominant role when it
comes to personal jurisdiction. 81 State long-arm statutes cannot extend

See also FED. R. CIv. P. 4 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (subdivision (k)):
There also may be a further Fifth Amendment constraint in that a plaintiffs forum
selection might be so inconvenient to a defendant that it would be a denial of 'fair play
and substantial justice' required by the due process clause, even though the defendant
had significant affiliating contacts with the United States.
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (subdivision (k))
(noting that the consequence of Omni was that a defendant could escape personal jurisdiction in a
federal court if it had "insufficient contact with any single state to support jurisdiction under state
long-arm legislation or meet the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment limitation on state
court territorial jurisdiction"); Omni, 484 U.S. at 108-09 (noting several obstacles to permitting
federal courts to authorize personal jurisdiction without positive-law authorization); United Rope
Distrib.'s, Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Omni holds
that personal jurisdiction may be created only by statute or federal rule with the force of
statute.... Unless a federal or state law authorizes personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the
court must dismiss the suit."); Jonathan Remy Nash, NationalPersonalJurisdiction(Feb. 6, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119383 [https://perma.cc/FKK9-9SDQ] (considering but rejecting the
argument that national personal jurisdiction can be obtained by common law). To be clear, Omni
did not categorically reject the notion that courts had "authority for common-law rulemaking" that
might trigger a Fifth Amendment standard. 484 U.S. at 108-09. The Court held instead that "we
would not fashion a rule for service in this litigation even if we had the power to do so." Id. at 109.
Theoretically, therefore, it remains an open question whether federal courts-without independent
positive-law authorization-might declare grounds for personal jurisdiction that would be subject
only to Fifth Amendment scrutiny.
81. Some scholars have argued that, with respect to foreign defendants, the more lenient
national-contacts standard should apply even in state court. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 2, at
235-41; Robin J. Effron, Solving the Nonresident Alien Due Process Paradox in Personal
Jurisdiction, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 123, 129-30 (2018); Lilly, supra note 2, at 116-17.
Relatedly, scholars have observed the tension between judicially imposed limits on foreign
defendants asserting constitutional rights and the idea that foreign defendants may challenge
personal jurisdiction on due process grounds. See, e.g., Effron, supra, at 130 (noting the "paradox"
that "a litigant's alien status is often a barrier to a full or robust assertion of many due process
rights, but alien status is simultaneously the foundation of the strongest possible assertion of the
due process protection of resisting the personal jurisdiction of an American court"); Austen L.
Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdictionover Nonresident Alien Defendants,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing limitations imposed by United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); and Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)). Although the
Supreme Court has never squarely considered these arguments, its decisions have assumed that
a foreign defendant may indeed challenge personal jurisdiction in state court on due process
grounds, and that the jurisdictional analysis hinges on the defendant's contacts with the forum
state. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877; Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918-19 (2011); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-14. It has applied
the same approach when foreign defendants are sued in federal court based on Rule 4(k)(1)(A),
which incorporates the jurisdictional restrictions that would apply to the state in which the district
court sits. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119-20 (2014).
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jurisdiction beyond what the Fourteenth Amendment would allow (and
they often extend to the full reach of the Constitution-whether
explicitly or by judicial interpretation). 82 Even in federal court, most
cases are subject to the same constraints that would apply in state court
because of Rule 4(k)(1)(A).83 Not surprisingly, all of the Supreme
Court's recent personal jurisdiction decisions-and nearly all of its
earlier ones-have hinged upon whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment would permit a state court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a particular defendant. 84
II. THREE EXAMPLES, THREE AREAS OF CONCERN
Three of the Supreme Court's recent decisions can be used to
highlight three distinct ways that the constitutional doctrine governing
personal jurisdiction can undermine access to justice and the
enforcement of substantive rights and obligations. The cases discussed
below hinge on three different aspects of the overarching jurisdictional
framework. McIntyre involved the basic threshold of minimum contacts
required for specific jurisdiction. Daimler involved the contacts
required for general jurisdiction. And Bristol-Myers involved the line
between specific and general jurisdiction-that is, when is general
jurisdiction the only option, such that the higher level of contacts
required for general jurisdiction must be established?
It should be clarified at the outset that this Article's analysis
does not take a position on long-running debates over the goals and
functions of adjudication. 5 The concerns detailed below regarding
access and enforcement are troubling regardless of whether one
believes that the core goal of adjudication is to resolve discrete disputes
between litigants or to serve and expound public values. 86 Put Simply,

82. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
84. One exception was Omni, where jurisdiction failed to comply with Louisiana's long-arm
statute. 484 U.S. at 108.
85. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 454 (2009)
(contrasting the "traditionally adversarial 'dispute resolution' model of adjudication" with a
"'public values' model ... in which judges articulate legal standards that affect large numbers of
stakeholders" (first citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 364 (1978); then citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1282-84 (1976); and then citing Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979))).
86. See Fiss, supra note 85, at 29 ('To my mind courts exist to give meaning to our public
values, not to resolve disputes.").
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neither function is well served if litigation cannot be pursued because
of a lack of personal jurisdiction.
A. McIntyre and the Home-State Scenario
One access-to-justice concern is that a lack of personal
jurisdiction can make it impossible for a plaintiff to obtain judicial
remedies in his or her home state. A good example of this scenario is
the first decision in the Supreme Court's recent group of cases,
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.87 The plaintiff, Robert
Nicastro, was a New Jersey resident who lost four fingers on his right
hand while operating a metal-shearing machine at the New Jersey
company where he worked.8 8 He sued J. McIntyre Machinery, the
British corporation that had manufactured the shearing machine, in a
New Jersey state court.8 9
By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court found that J. McIntyre was
not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. There was no
majority opinion, however. Justice Kennedy wrote a plurality opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas. 90
Justice Breyer authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito. 9 1
And Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan. 92
The fragmented Court reflected not only disagreement about the
governing legal principles and their application but also disagreement
about the factual record. All agreed that J. McIntyre had retained an
Ohio-based company, McIntyre Machinery of America, to sell
J. McIntyre's machines to customers in the United States. 93 J. McIntyre
had also advertised its machines by sending its officials to trade shows
in "such cities as Chicago, Las Vegas, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego,

87. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
88. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion); id. at 895 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Nicastro
was injured "in the course of his employment at Curcio Scrap Metal (CSM) in Saddle Brook, New
Jersey").
89. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion); id. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 877 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 887 (Breyer, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 893 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion) (describing the Ohio-based distributor as "an independent
company" that had "agreed to sell J. McIntyre's machines in the United States"); id. at 887 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (noting that J. McIntyre sold its machines "through an independent distributor in
the United States"); id. at 896 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("McIntyre UK retained an Ohio-based
company, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. ... as its exclusive distributor for the entire United
States.").
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and San Francisco," 94 but never in New Jersey. It was unclear, however,
whether only one of J. McIntyre's shear machines-the one purchased
by Nicastro's employer-ended up in New Jersey, or whether as many
as four such machines were sold to New Jersey customers. 95 The
Justices also disagreed over whether they could consider either the size
of New Jersey's scrap-metal industry or the number of New Jersey
businesses that had attended the U.S. trade shows where J. McIntyre
officials had promoted its products, because that information had not
been part of the lower-court record.9 6
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion asserted that personal
jurisdiction comports with due process only to the extent that a party
"submit[s] to a State's authority." 97 Although he recognized that
jurisdiction may be appropriate over a manufacturer or distributor who
"seek[s] to serve a given State's market," 98 Justice Kennedy reasoned
that "[t]he defendant's transmission of goods permits the exercise of
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the
forum." 99 And this targeting inquiry "requires a forum-by-forum, or
sovereign-by-sovereign,
analysis."1 00
Therefore,
even
though
1
0
1
J. McIntyre targeted the United States,
"the United States is a
distinct sovereign." 102 For jurisdiction in a New Jersey court, what
matters is the defendant's "purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not
with the United States." 103
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion argued that the British
manufacturer's machine "arrived in Nicastro's New Jersey workplace
not randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connections and

94. Id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 878 (plurality opinion) (noting that
"J. McIntyre officials attended annual conventions for the scrap recycling industry to advertise
J. McIntyre's machines alongside the distributor" and that these conventions "took place in various
States, but never in New Jersey").
95. Compare id. at 878 (plurality opinion) (stating that "no more than four
machines ... including the machine that caused the injuries that are the basis for this suit, ended
up in New Jersey" but noting that "the record suggests only one"), with id. at 888 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("The American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one machine to a New
Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's employer.").
96. See infra notes 108-109, 113 and accompanying text.
97. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 880 (plurality opinion).
98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 884.
101. Id. at 885 (noting that J. McIntyre "directed marketing and sales efforts at the United
States").
102. Id. at 884.
103. Id. at 886.
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distribution system that McIntyre UK deliberately arranged." 104 The
defendant sought "to reach and profit from the United States market as
a whole,"10 5 including by engaging a U.S. distributor "to promote and
sell its machines in the United States."10 6 Jurisdiction was proper,
therefore, because the defendant had "'purposefully availed itself of
the United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or
a discrete collection of States."10 7 Justice Ginsburg also noted that New
Jersey processed more scrap metal than any other U.S. state,10 8 and
that nearly one hundred New Jersey businesses were members of the
industry group sponsoring the U.S. trade shows at which J. McIntyre
officials promoted their machines.1 09
Although Justices Breyer and Alito agreed with the plurality on
the ultimate result, they rejected Justice Kennedy's "strict rules that
limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not 'inten[d] to submit to the
power of a sovereign' and cannot 'be said to have targeted the
forum.' "110 Nonetheless, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion found that
the plaintiff "failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that it was
constitutionally proper to exercise jurisdiction" over the British
manufacturer."'x But he based this conclusion on a narrow view of the
factual record. Justice Breyer deemed the record to include evidence of
only a single New Jersey purchase of a J. McIntyre-manufactured
machine.11 2 And he emphasized that the plaintiff had introduced no
evidence regarding either "the size and scope of New Jersey's scrapmetal business" or "potential New Jersey customers who might . . . have
regularly attended [the] trade shows" where J. McIntyre officials had
advertised their products. 113
As will be discussed in more detail below, the fragmented
decision and the disputes about the factual record in McIntyre leave
prior precedent undisturbed and broader doctrinal questions

104. Id. at 898 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 905.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 895 (citing data indicating that New Jersey facilities processed over two million
tons of scrap metal in 2008 and that this "outpac[ed] Kentucky, its nearest competitor, by nearly
30 percent").
109. Id. at 895 n. 1 (citing the member directory of the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries,
Inc.).
110. Id. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 882 (plurality opinion)).
111. Id. at 887-88.
112. Id. at 888 ("The American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one machine to a
New Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's employer, Mr. Curcio." (citations omitted)).
113. Id. at 889.
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unanswered. 1 1 4 That said, McIntyre nicely illustrates a concern one can
call the home-state scenario. A plaintiff is injured in her home state,
relevant events occur in her home state, and she seeks remedies from
an out-of-state defendant by suing in the courts of her home state. In
this situation, the home state has a strong interest in adjudicating the
case, which is brought on behalf of an in-state plaintiff who was injured
as a result of in-state occurrences.11 5 To require the plaintiff to seek
judicial remedies outside her home state can impose significant cost and
inconvenience. 1 16 The plaintiff in this scenario may lack the
wherewithal-financial or otherwise-to access justice elsewhere. From
the plaintiffs perspective, the relevant events and injuries are homestate events that warrant judicial remedies from home-state
tribunals. 117
B. Daimler and the Safety-Net Scenario
Access-to-justice concerns might also arise in cases where a
particular court does not have a strong connection to the plaintiff or the
underlying events, but exercising jurisdiction over the defendant is
necessary to provide what might be called a remedial safety net. The
Supreme Court's recent decision in DaimlerAG v. Bauman118 provides
a useful illustration.
The plaintiffs in Daimler sued Daimler AG, a German company
with its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, under the Alien Tort
Statute.119 They alleged that Daimler's Argentinian subsidiary

114. See infra Sections III.A & III.C.
115. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) ("A State generally
has a 'manifest interest' in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries
inflicted by out-of-state actors." (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957))).
116. See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting "the burden on
Nicastro to go to Nottingham, England to gain recompense for an injury he sustained using
McIntyre's product at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New Jersey"); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified
Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of
Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 348 (2013) (expressing concern that "consumers and
employees would not be able to seek redress in the state where they purchase or receive defective
products or services, or live, or were injured").
117. See, e.g., John Vail, Six Questions in Light of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63
S.C. L. REV. 517, 524 (2012) (describing the possibility that, under McIntyre, "one of Faulkner's
Mississippi mud farmers-another gentleman whose rich experiences were confined to a small
geographic area-injured at his homeplace by a derelict Airbus jet" would have to "venture to
[France] to file his action").
118. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
119. Id. at 120-22. The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012), has provided subjectmatter jurisdiction for a variety of claims based on international human rights obligations. See,
e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 525 (4th Cir. 2014); Filartiga v. Pena-
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committed human rights violations during the 1970s and 1980s. 120 The
Ninth Circuit found that California could assert general jurisdiction
over Daimler because of the activities of MBUSA, Daimler's U.S.
subsidiary. 121 MBUSA was headquartered in New Jersey but had
multiple facilities in California, made over $4.6 billion in annual sales
in California, and was the largest supplier of vehicles to the California
market. 122
With Justice Ginsburg writing the majority opinion, the
Supreme Court concluded that Daimler was not subject to general
jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg first rejected the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that MBUSA's contacts could be attributed to Daimler for
jurisdictional purposes.123 More significantly, however, Justice
Ginsburg then concluded that general jurisdiction would not be proper
in California even if MBUSA's contacts were attributable to Daimler.
The Daimler Court began with a reprise of its 2011 Goodyear
decision, in which it unanimously held that general jurisdiction
requires that the defendant's "affiliations with the State" be "so
continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home"
there. 124 Under this standard, the paradigm locations for general
jurisdiction over a corporation are its state of incorporation and its
principal place of business. 12 5 Even if MBUSA's contacts could be
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-cv-05395, 2014 WL
1669873 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014).
120. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 121-22.
121. Although the Daimler case was filed in a California federal court, personal jurisdiction
was based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A). See id. at 124-26. Accordingly, personal
jurisdiction hinged on whether it would be constitutional for a California state court to assert
personal jurisdiction. See id.; see also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing Rule
4(k)(1)(A)). Daimler did not address whether personal jurisdiction could be based on Rule 4(k)(2),
which authorizes personal jurisdiction in federal court over claims arising under federal law when
the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). This was
apparently because the Ninth Circuit did not base its ruling on Rule 4(k)(2). See Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 918 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011). Other lower courts, however, have
recognized that Rule 4(k)(2) applies to Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") cases. See, e.g., Mwani v. bin
Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 423,
434-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). That could change the jurisdictional calculus because the constitutional
outer limits would be governed by the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.
See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
122. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 123-24; id. at 147-48 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
123. See id. at 134-36 (majority opinion).
124. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); see Daimler,
571 U.S. at 121-22 (requiring that "the corporation's affiliations with the State in which suit is
brought [must be] so constant and pervasive 'as to render it essentially at home in the forum
State.' " (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919)); see also supranotes 56-58 and accompanying text.
125. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136-37 ("With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation
and principal place of business are 'paradig[m] bases for general jurisdiction.'" (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924.

2018]

ACCESS, RATIONALITY, AND JURISDICTION

1423

attributed entirely to Daimler itself, California would not be one of
those "paradigms."1 2 6
Daimler did recognize that a corporation could potentially be
subject to general jurisdiction beyond its state of incorporation or
principal place of business. 127 But Daimler emphasized that a
corporation is not subject to general jurisdiction "in every State in which
a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic
course of business." 128 Justice Ginsburg wrote that general jurisdiction
is not simply a function of "the magnitude of the defendant's in-state
contacts." 129 Rather, a court must make a comparative assessment of
the defendant's activities "in their entirety, nationwide and
worldwide." 13 0 Accordingly, "[a] corporation that operates in many
places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them." 131
Although Justice Sotomayor concurred in Daimler on other
grounds, she strongly criticized this approach to general jurisdiction.
She argued that Justice Ginsburg's "proportionality requirement" 13 2
was inconsistent with the Court's general jurisdiction precedents,
under which the analysis properly focused on "the magnitude of the.
defendant's in-state contacts, not the relative magnitude of those
contacts in comparison to the defendant's contacts with other States." 133
Justice Sotomayor memorably wrote: "In recent years, Americans have
grown accustomed to the concept of multinational corporations that are
supposedly 'too big to fail'; today the Court deems Daimler 'too big for'
general jurisdiction.' "134

126. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138-39 ("[N]either Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in
California, nor does either entity have its principal place of business there.").
127. Id. at 136-38 ("Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general
jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply
typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.").
128. Id. at 138-39 ("That formulation, we hold, is unacceptably grasping.").
129. Id. at 139 n.20.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 153-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In the later BNSF decision, Justice Sotomayor
criticized "the comparative contacts analysis invented in Daimler." BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137
S. Ct. 1549, 1561 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Daimler, 571 U.S.. at 148-51 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 915 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 447-48
(1952); and Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). Justice Sotomayor placed
particular emphasis on the Perkinscase, which the Daimlermajority cited as a "'textbook case' of
general jurisdiction" but which Justice Sotomayor believed was "all but impossible to reconcile"
with the majority's "proportionality test." Id. at 148-53 & nn.7-8 (discussing Perkins).
134. Id. at 143-45.
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At first glance, it might indeed seem surprising that Justice
Ginsburg led the way in rejecting jurisdiction over Daimler when she
had dissented vigorously from the Court's refusal to permit jurisdiction
over J. McIntyre. 135 The explanation, however, lies in the difference
between specific and general jurisdiction. To accept general jurisdiction
over Daimler in California would mean that Daimler could be sued in
California "if a Daimler-manufactured vehicle overturned in Poland,
injuring a Polish driver and passenger." 136 As a practical matter, there
may be little justification for allowing courts in California (or anywhere
else in the United States) to have jurisdiction over what is often called
a "foreign-cubed" 137 case-that is, a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign
defendant based on acts occurring in a foreign country.1 3 8
Put another way, a case like Daimler does not present the same
sort of access-to-justice concerns that were present in a case like
McIntyre, where a plaintiff is injured in her home state, relevant events
occur in her home state, and she seeks remedies from an out-of-state
defendant in the courts of her home state. If a lawsuit involves events
occurring in Argentina, conduct directed at Argentina, and injuries
suffered in Argentina-for which a German corporation is allegedly
responsible-then Argentina or Germany would seem to be more
appropriate venues. That is precisely why the plaintiffs in Daimler
invoked general jurisdiction. Their claims did not arise from or relate
139
to any of the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
Imagine, however, a case like Daimler where there were
insurmountable obstacles to obtaining judicial remedies in the foreign
countries that would have jurisdiction. It might be important to allow
U.S. courts to hear such foreign-cubed claims-as a last resort-when
foreign legal systems are unavailable or inadequate. There is no
apparent safety-valve, however, in Justice Ginsburg's restrictive
approach to general jurisdiction. And this could indeed undermine
access-to-justice concerns that Justice Ginsburg-and other Justices
who joined the Daimler majority-have identified in the transnational

135. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's dissent).
136. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 121-23.
137. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1098 (2015)
(describing "foreign-cubed" cases).
138. Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to "ForeignSquared"
Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-thedoor-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ [https://perma.cc/F7LK-SDJ9].
139. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 121-23 ("Plaintiffs invoked the court's general or all-purpose
jurisdiction. California, they urge, is a place where Daimler may be sued on any and all claims
against it, wherever in the world the claims may arise.").
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context. They did so, in fact, just nine months before the Daimler
decision, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 1 4 0
In Kiobel, Nigerian citizens residing in the United States sued
foreign oil companies under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), alleging
that those companies and their subsidiaries aided and abetted
violations of international law by the Nigerian government-including
extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and
property destruction. 141 The Court split 5-4, with Chief Justice
Roberts's majority opinion concluding that the lawsuit could not
proceed because of "the presumption against extraterritoriality." 1 4 2
That presumption applied to claims under the ATS, and therefore
claims based on "violations of the law of nations occurring outside the
United States" were barred.143
To Chief Justice Roberts, applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality to the facts of Kiobel was fairly straightforward
because "all the relevant conduct took place outside the United,
States." 144 Chief Justice Roberts added, however, that "even where theclaims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must
do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against..
extraterritorial application." 1 4 5 He observed: "Corporations are often.
present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere
corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a
statute more specific than the ATS would be required." 146
Four Justices refused to join Chief Justice Roberts's majority
opinion. Although they agreed that the Kiobel case should be dismissed,
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion on behalf of himself and Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan sketched out a very different

140. 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
141. Id. at 111-14.
142. Id. at 124.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 124-25.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 125. Kiobel's presumption against extraterritoriality applies only with respect to
the federal common law cause of action that the Supreme Court recognized for asserting federal
jurisdiction under the ATS. See id. at 115 (noting that the Court had "held that federal courts may
recognize private claims [for such violations] under federal common law" in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), and that "[tihe question here is not whether petitioners have stated
a proper claim under the ATS, but whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory
of a foreign sovereign"). The presumption against extraterritoriality does not automatically apply
to causes of action based on state law or foreign law. See Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock,
State Remedies for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L. REV. 397, 481 (2018) ("Kiobel rested on a presumption
against interpreting federal statutes to apply extraterritorially, and said nothing about state
courts proceeding under state common law.").
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approach to ATS claims. At the level of first principles, Justice Breyer
against
presumption
the
"invok[ing]
against
argued
extraterritoriality." 147 Instead, he would find jurisdiction under the
ATS where "(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct
substantially and adversely affects an important American national
interest." 148 As to the third category, Justice Breyer noted the United
States' "distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming
a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind." 149
Justice Breyer then cited examples of lower federal court
decisions that had invoked this distinct interest.1 5 0 All of these were
cases brought against individual defendants who (a) were citizens of
foreign countries, (b) had perpetrated abuses outside the United States,
and (c) were living in the United States at the time of the lawsuit. In
that situation, personal jurisdiction is unlikely to be a problem because
serving the defendant with process while they are physically in the
United States creates personal jurisdiction in the state where service
occurs. 151

Suppose, however, that the "torturer or other enemy of
mankind" is not an individual who is physically present in the United
States. Imagine, instead, an individual or entity who engages in
significant economic or other activity in the United States from afar. Or
imagine a foreign entity that has a substantial physical presence in the
United States but that-as an entity rather than a natural person-is

147. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 134-35 (discussing In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467
(9th Cir. 1994); and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
151. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("The short
of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because
it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "); id. at 628-29 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("I agree with Justice Scalia that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally
permits a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if he is served with process while
voluntarily present in the forum State."); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246-51 (2d Cir.
1995) (upholding personal jurisdiction based on in-forum service of process in an ATS case against
the leader of Bosnian-Serb forces); id. at 247 ("[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 4(e)(2) specifically
authorizes personal service of a summons and complaint upon an individual physically present
within a judicial district of the United States, and such personal service comports with the
requirements of due process for the assertion of personal jurisdiction." (citing Burnham, 495 U.S.
604)).
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exempt from tag jurisdiction based on in-forum service of process. 1 5 2 It
may be the case that justice in the defendant's home country-or the
country where the abuses occurred-may be effectively unavailable. 153
Yet the Court's restrictive approach to general jurisdiction might
prevent access to U.S. courts, 1 5 4 even though at least four Justices-and
perhaps five 1 5 5-would perceive jurisdiction to be in the United States'

152. See, e.g., Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014) ("We hold that
Burnham does not apply to corporations."). Regardless of whether personal jurisdiction may be
obtained, suits against foreign corporations now face the additional obstacle that the federal
common law cause of action for enforcing violations of international law under the ATS does not
extend to foreign corporate defendants. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018)
("[A]bsent further action from Congress it would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability
to foreign corporations."). Because this conclusion was based on the lack of congressional approval
for a federal cause of action that would reach foreign corporate defendants, the logic of Jesner
would not foreclose claims against foreign corporations based on causes of action authorized by
state law or foreign law. See Davis & Whytock, supra note 146, at 405 (noting "the states' distinct
remedial authority within our federal system"); id. at 470 ("If, according to the forum's choice-oflaw rules, foreign law applies and provides a basis for the claim, then the suit might proceed.").
Even as to the federal ATS cause of action, Jesner does not address claims against entities other
than corporations.
153. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 457, 458 (2001) ("Needless to say, the victims of such abuses often are unable to obtain redress
in their home countries."); Davis & Whytock, supra note 146, at 399 ("Often, . . . victims of human
rights abuses will find it futile to seek a remedy in a domestic court of the country where the abuses
occurred."). Whether an adequate alternative forum exists has long been relevant for deciding
motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
254 & n.22 (1981) (noting that "[a]t the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must
determine whether there exists an alternative forum" and that "where the remedy offered by the
other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative"); see
also, e.g., Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1226-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming
the district court's conclusion that the judicial system in India was not an adequate alternative
forum).
154. A foreign corporation with its principal place of business abroad, for example, would likely
be immune from general jurisdiction in any U.S. court. See, e.g., Davis & Whytock, supra note 146,
at 463 ("Some commentators suggest that the Court's personal jurisdiction holding in DaimlerAG
v. Bauman makes personal jurisdiction an even more imposing barrier to human rights claims in
U.S. courts."); Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for
Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (PostKiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 163 (2014).
155. Justice Kennedy-although he joined Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Kiobelwrote a brief concurrence clarifying that the majority "is careful to leave open a number of
significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute" and that
"the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require
some further elaboration and explanation" in future cases. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Some viewed this as a signal that Justice Kennedy may have been receptive to
permitting ATS claims in the situations identified by Justice Breyer. See Cortelyou C. Kenney,
Measuring TransnationalHuman Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053, 1114 (2015) ("Justice Breyer's
Kiobel II concurrence combined with Justice Kennedy's opinion suggests there is still hope-and
possibly a majority of the Justices-who believe that jus cogens violations committed abroad can
be litigated under the ATS if not through other means."); Note, Clarifying Kiobel's "Touch and
Concern" Test, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1902, 1909 (2017) ("Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote for
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national interest. Enforcement of the underlying substantive rights
(such as those created by international law) might be thwarted by the
lack of a judicial safety net in U.S. courts. 156
Justice Sotomayor's approach to general jurisdiction in Daimler
is less likely to create such a problem. As alluded to above, Justice
Sotomayor did not rule out the possibility that Daimler would indeed
have sufficient contacts with California to be subject to general
jurisdiction. 15 7 Nonetheless, she found that Daimler should not be
subject to jurisdiction in California because it would be "unreasonable"
under the second prong of the constitutional test. 158 That
reasonableness inquiry, however, would consider whether "a more
appropriate forum is available."1 5 9 Justice Sotomayor's analysis can
account for the safety-net scenario, because the lack of an alternative
forum strengthens the reasonableness of jurisdiction in U.S. courts. By
contrast, the majority's approach threatens to preclude jurisdiction

the majority, and he seemed to want to leave the door open for extraterritorial ATS causes of
action."). Whether the same holds true for Justice Kennedy's successor remains to be seen.
156. This is not to say that U.S. courts may act as a safety net with respect to all international
law norms. For example, the Supreme Court has set a high bar for whether a particular claim is
actionable under the ATS: "[F]ederal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms" of "violation of safe conducts, infringement
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715, 732 (2004);
see also id. at 761-62 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that "substantive uniformity does not
automatically mean that universal jurisdiction is appropriate" and arguing that "universal tort
jurisdiction" requires a "procedural consensus"); id. at 762-63 (stating that such a "procedural
consensus" exists for "torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes" but not for "the
claim at issue here-where the underlying substantive claim concerns arbitrary arrest, outside
the United States, of a citizen of one foreign country by another"). Lawsuits based on state law or
foreign law causes of action might adopt different formulae for identifying which international law
norms are suitable for private civil actions. See Davis & Whytock, supra note 146, at 480 (noting
that "Sosa's concerns about federal judicial authority do not all map onto state judicial authority"
and that state courts, unlike federal courts, "may have common law authority to enforce
[customary international law]").
157. See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. Justice Sotomayor ultimately found that
the record was not sufficiently developed to assess whether Daimler's contacts with California
could justify general jurisdiction, in part due to what she viewed as Daimler's concession on this
issue in the lower courts. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 146-49 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). She observed, however, that "what little we do know suggests that Daimler was wise
to concede what it did." Id. at 146-48.
158. Id. at 141-43 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("The Court can and should decide this case on
the far simpler ground that, no matter how extensive Daimler's contacts with California, that
State's exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable"); id. ("Our personal jurisdiction precedents
call for a two-part analysis."); see also supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (describing the
reasonableness inquiry). Justice Sotomayor's argument regarding reasonableness prompted the
Daimler majority to reject the notion that the reasonableness inquiry plays any independent role
in the context of general jurisdiction. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
159. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 141-43 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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"even if no other judicial system was available to provide relief." 16 0 If
the only jurisdictionally permissible judicial systems are effectively
unavailable, there may be no way for plaintiffs to pursue their legal
claims.
C. Bristol-Myers and the Aggregation Scenario
A third situation where personal jurisdiction doctrine may
undermine access to judicial remedies and the enforcement of
substantive law can be called the aggregation scenario. Denying
personal jurisdiction can block the efficient aggregation of claims and
may make it economically impossible to hold defendants accountable
when the costs of individual lawsuits outweigh the likely individual
recovery. 16 1 The Supreme Court's most recent decision on personal
jurisdiction, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,162 illustrates
the potential problem. Bristol-Myers involved a group of nearly seven
hundred plaintiffs from thirty-four states who sued Bristol-Myers
Squibb ("BMS") in California state court for injuries relating to its
blood-thinning drug Plavix. Each plaintiff asserted identical theories of
liability, although only eighty-six of them were from California. 163
As to the California plaintiffs, there was no doubt that specific
jurisdiction was appropriate. BMS purposefully sold Plavix to the
California market, leading to the sale of almost 187 million Plavix pills
in the state and more than $900 million in earnings from those sales.1 6 4
160. Id. at 158-59.
161. See, e.g., In re Baby Prod. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that
class actions "may have an important deterrent value" with respect to "so-called negative value
claims, that is, claims that could not be brought on an individual basis because the transaction
costs of bringing an individual action exceed the potential relief'); Kenneth W. Dam, ClassActions:
Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 73 (1975)
("Where the individual claims are too small to make actual compensation of the class members
financially feasible, then the importance of the class action for deterrence, and hence for overall
efficiency, must be assessed."); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 108
(2006) (noting that the "deterrence of future wrongdoing" is "the strongest justification for smallclaims class action litigation"); Harry Kalven, Jr., & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Functionof the ClassSuit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 717 (1941) ("[T]he suit which might not be brought
at all because the demands on legal skill and time would be disproportionate to the original client's
stake can, when turned into a class suit, be brought and handled in a manner commensurate with
its magnitude.").
162. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
163. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 877-78 (Cal. 2016).
164. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778; see also Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 888 ('The California
plaintiffs' claims concerning the alleged misleading marketing and promotion of Plavix and
injuries arising out of its distribution to and ingestion by California plaintiffs certainly arise from
BMS's purposeful contacts with this state. . . .").
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But what about the non-California plaintiffs? As a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in New York, BMS would not be
subject to general jurisdiction in California under the Supreme Court's
recent case law. 1 6 5 The key question, therefore, was whether California
could assert specific jurisdiction with respect to the claims by nonCalifornia plaintiffs.16 6

The Supreme Court of California found specific jurisdiction was
proper. It reasoned that even the non-California plaintiffs' claims
"related to" BMS's contacts with California, because of "BMS's
extensive contacts with California as part of Plavix's nationwide
marketing, its sales of Plavix in this state, and its maintenance of
research and development facilities here." 167 The California Supreme
Court also endorsed "a sliding scale approach to specific jurisdiction,"
under which "the more wide ranging the defendant's forum contacts,
the more readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and
the claim." 168
By an 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that
"the California courts cannot claim specific jurisdiction" with respect to
the non-California plaintiffs. 169 At the outset, Justice Alito's majority
opinion rejected the California Supreme Court's "sliding scale"
approach, which he called "a loose and spurious form of general
jurisdiction." 7 0 The Court then reaffirmed the basic principles the
Court had articulated in previous decisions. Specific jurisdiction applies
when the suit "aris[es] out of or relat[es] to the defendant's contacts
with the forum," which requires "an affiliation between the forum and
the underlying controversy." 17 1 Specific jurisdiction "is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction." 17 2
165. See supra notes 124-131 and accompanying text; see also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.
Ct. 1549, 1554-59 (2017) (finding that Montana lacked general jurisdiction over a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Texas and noting that the defendant was not "so
heavily engaged in activity in Montana 'as to render [it] essentially at home' in that State"
(alteration in original) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139)).
166. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777 ("The California Supreme Court held that the California
courts have specific jurisdiction to entertain the nonresidents' claims. We now reverse.").
167. Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 890-91.
168. Id. at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.,
926 P.2d 1085, 1098 (1996)).
169. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1782.
170. Id. at 1781.
171. Id. at 1780 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117, 126 (2014); and then quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)).
172. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).

2018]

ACCESS, RATIONALITY, AND JURISDICTION

1431

Applying these principles, the majority found that specific
jurisdiction could not include the claims by non-California residents.
Justice Alito wrote that "[t]he mere fact that other plaintiffs were
prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California-and allegedly
sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents-does not allow the
State to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents' claims." 17 3 He
explained: "'[A] defendant's relationship with a third party, standing
alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.' This remains true even
when third parties (here, the plaintiffs who reside in California) can
bring claims similar to those brought by the nonresidents." 7 4 It was
also irrelevant "that BMS conducted research in California on matters
unrelated to Plavix" because "[w]hat is needed-and what is missing
here-is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at
issue."1 75 Here, "[t]he relevant plaintiffs are not California residents
and do not claim to have suffered harm in that State," and "all the
conduct giving rise to the nonresidents' claims occurred elsewhere." 176
As with other cases on general jurisdiction, Justice Sotomayor
was the lone dissenter. She expressed concern that the majority's,
approach "will make it profoundly difficult for plaintiffs who are injured
in different States by a defendant's nationwide course of conduct to sue
that defendant in a single, consolidated action,"17 7 and "may make it
impossible to bring certain mass actions at all."178 Whether Justice

173. Id. at 1781.
174. Id. (internal ellipses and citation omitted) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123
(2014)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1782.
177. Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
178. Id. Justice Sotomayor noted, however, the possibility that the majority's reasoning in
Bristol-Myers might not apply with equal force to class actions, for which "[n]onnamed class
members may be parties for some purposes and not for others." Id. at 1789 n.4 (internal ellipses
omitted) (citing Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002)) ("The Court today does not confront
the question whether its opinion here would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff injured
in the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured
there."). A split has already developed in the lower courts regarding whether Bristol-Myers applies
to class actions. Compare Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 126 (D.D.C. 2018)
("[T]he court agrees with Plaintiffs and concludes that Bristol-Myers does not apply to class
actions."), and Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1369 (N.D.
Ga. 2018) (finding notwithstanding Bristol-Myers that the court could "exercise jurisdiction over a
nationwide class claim on the strength of its specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to
the named plaintiffs claim"), with In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litig., No. 16-CIV-696
(BMC)(GRB), 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017) ("The constitutional requirements
of due process does not wax and wane when the complaint is individual or on behalf of a class.").
It remains to be seen whether Bristol-Myers will affect consolidation of actions for pretrial
proceedings under the multidistrict litigation ("MDL") statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); it is an
open question how courts should assess whether personal jurisdiction is proper in the MDL
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Sotomayor is ultimately correct in this prediction remains to be seen.
But there is legitimate cause for concern. If Bristol-Myers is read to
require plaintiff-by-plaintiff assessment of whether jurisdiction is
specific or general, it could be impossible in some situations to
aggregate related claims on a nationwide basis. 17 9 For certain kinds of
make
may
claims 1 8 0-this
negative-value
claims-especially
meaningful access to justice impossible.
Obstacles to aggregation might also impact requests for
injunctive relief. There has been considerable controversy recently over
whether federal courts have the power to issue so-called "nationwide
injunctions" 18 1 in response to claims by particular plaintiffs that a
particular government policy violates federal law. 182 For example, a
federal judge in 2015 imposed a nationwide injunction prohibiting the
Obama administration from implementing its Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans ("DAPA") program.1 83 More recently, federal
transferee district-or even whether such an inquiry is required. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 69,
at 1295-99 (describing the view that the "fiction of limited transfer allows MDL to get around the
limits that Rule 4 places on a federal court's personal jurisdiction over a class action or mass
joinder" and that "the unique kind of consolidation in an MDL is an acceptable exercise of federal
power under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm
of MultidistrictLitigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1208-15 (2018) (summarizing approaches
to this issue by federal courts and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation); id. at 1228
(arguing that "the Court should require that there be proper jurisdiction in both the transferor
court and the transferee court, but measured under different criteria").
179. That reading of Bristol-Myers would not foreclose nationwide aggregation in a forum
where the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction-such as a corporation's principal place of
business or state of incorporation. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783 ("Our decision does not
prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining together in a consolidated action in
the States that have general jurisdiction over BMS. BMS concedes that such suits could be brought
in either New York or Delaware."). This option likely would not be available, however, either for
foreign defendants or in cases brought against multiple domestic defendants who do not share a
principal place of business or state of incorporation. See id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether it would be "possible to bring a nationwide mass action against two or more
defendants headquartered and incorporated in different States" or "against a defendant not
headquartered or incorporated in the United States"). Bristol-Myers also does not foreclose the
possibility that some state would have enough of a connection to all plaintiffs' or class members'
claims to support specific jurisdiction. Whether specific jurisdiction is possible would depend not
only on the underlying facts of a given case but also the methodology for evaluating whether a
sufficient affiliation with the state exists to permit specific jurisdiction. The latter question is
addressed infra Sections TV.A-IV.B.
180. See supra note 161.
181. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 500-01 (2009) (recognizing but not deciding
"the question whether, if respondents prevailed, a nationwide injunction would be appropriate").
182. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017); Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the
Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide
Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017).
183. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2015). The preliminary
injunction was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, which concluded that "[i]t is not beyond the power of
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judges have imposed nationwide injunctions prohibiting the Trump
administration from rescinding President Obama's Deferred Actions for
Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program. 184 Nationwide injunctions
prohibiting the enforcement of several sections of Trump's executive
orders on immigration made two trips to the Supreme Court. 18 5
The permissible breadth of an injunction in any given case
presents difficult questions. The debate on this issue has presumed,
however, that if a nationwide class action were certified, a single court
could issue a nationwide injunction. 186 If Bristol-Myers is read to
prevent aggregation of claims by plaintiffs located in different states,
however, this could be impossible. No single state-and no single
federal district whose jurisdiction is aligned with the state where it is
located under Rule 4(k)(1)(A)-might have jurisdiction to entertain so
broad a suit unless the named plaintiffs choose a state or district that
has general jurisdiction over all relevant defendants.1 8 7

a court, in appropriate circumstances, to issue a nationwide injunction." Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015). An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed. See United States
v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2271 (2016) (mem.).
184. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D.
Cal. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
185. In one round of litigation, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and stayed the lower
court's injunction "with respect to foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship with a
person or entity in the United States." Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080,
2083, 2087 (2017). After the President's temporary executive orders expired, the Supreme Court
declared that the case was moot and vacated the lower court judgment. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 377, 377 (2017) (mem.). A challenge to President Trump's subsequent executive order led to
another preliminary injunction, which was upheld by the Ninth Circuit but reversed by the
Supreme Court. See Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (2017), reversed sub nom., Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). Although one of the questions presented in the petition for certiorari was
"[w]hether the global injunction is impermissibly overbroad," Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,
Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 333818, the Supreme Court majority opinion did
not resolve that particular question. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 ("Our disposition of the case makes
it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the nationwide scope of the injunction issued by the
District Court."). But cf. id. at 2424-25 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Merits aside, I write separately
to address the remedy that the plaintiffs sought and obtained in this case. .. . I am skeptical that
district courts have the authority to enter universal injunctions.").
186. See Bray, supra note 182, at 419 (describing the problem as "in non-class actions, federal
courts are issuing injunctions that are universal in scope-injunctions that prohibit the
enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order not only against the plaintiff, but also against
anyone" (first emphasis added)).
187. Imagine, for example, that the State of Hawaii-the plaintiff in one of the challenges to
the Trump administration's executive orders on immigration-was the named plaintiff in a Rule
23(b)(2) class action on behalf of a nationwide class of plaintiffs. In the wake of Bristol-Myers, it
might be argued that a court in Hawaii lacks personal jurisdiction with respect to claims by nonHawaii class members.
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D. Solving the Access-to-Justice Problems
Having described three scenarios where a lack of personal
jurisdiction can undermine access to justice, this Section briefly
summarizes the doctrinal obstacles facing each one. For the home-state
scenario, the potential problem is that courts may adopt too restrictive
an approach to the specific jurisdiction assessment of whether the
defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state,
forcing plaintiffs to bear the cost of litigating outside of their home
state. As Part III will establish, however, the Supreme Court's recent
cases do not mandate a more restrictive approach to the basic minimum
contacts standard. A sensible approach to minimum contacts is entirely
consistent with the Court's case law to date, and will mitigate concerns
that arise when plaintiffs who are injured in their home state sue in the
courts of their home state.
For the safety-net and aggregation scenarios, the problem is not
the basic minimum contacts standard. It was clear that Bristol-Myers
Squibb would be subject to jurisdiction in California as to California
plaintiffs,1 8 8 and there would be little doubt that Daimler AG would be
subject to jurisdiction in California in a case involving a vehicle that
Daimler had designed and manufactured and that was sold to a
California customer and caused an accident on California roads. 189
Problems arise when (1) a case is assessed under a general jurisdiction
standard, and (2) jurisdiction is therefore subject to the Court's newly
restrictive "essentially-at-home" test. As described above, applying the
general jurisdiction test in the safety-net and aggregation scenarios can
effectively prevent defendants from being held accountable-in the
former because alternative forums may be unavailable, and in the latter
because broad aggregation may be necessary to make meritorious
claims economically viable. The solution-as Part IV will show-is to
clarify the line between specific and general jurisdiction. Properly
understood, the safety-net and aggregation scenarios can in many
instances be treated as specific jurisdiction cases rather than general
jurisdiction cases.

188. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
189. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 n.5 (2014) ("[I]f a California plaintiff,
injured in a California accident involving a Daimler-manufactured vehicle, sued Daimler in
California court alleging that the vehicle was defectively designed, that court's adjudicatory
authority would be premised on specific jurisdiction.").
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III. MODERN MINIMUM CONTACTS

This Part argues that the Supreme Court's recent cases do not
mandate a more restrictive approach to the basic minimum contacts
standard. Of the Court's six recent cases, only two address whether the
defendant's contacts with the forum state were sufficient to establish
90 and
specific jurisdiction: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastroo
Walden v. Fiore.191 Section A discusses the McIntyre decision, situating
that decision with the Court's earlier case law on personal jurisdiction
in the context of what is often referred to as the "stream of commerce."
Section B examines Walden, as well as earlier decisions addressing
personal jurisdiction over intentional tort claims. Section C concludes
by showing that McIntyre and Walden do not depart from the Court's
earlier case law on the minimum contacts threshold, and that unusual
factual aspects of those cases mean they should not be read to create
significant obstacles when plaintiffs sue in their home state based on
events occurring there.
A. The Stream of Commerce
One area where the basic minimum contacts requirement has
been hotly contested is the so-called "stream of commerce." The Court's
engagement with this issue began with World- Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, where the Court endorsed the idea that personal
jurisdiction is proper over a defendant "that delivers its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State." 192 More specifically, the
Court stated that
if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor ... arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in
other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. 193

These rules did not, however, justify personal jurisdiction over
the particular defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen. The plaintiffs,
190. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
191. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). Although the Bristol-Myers decision also addressed the availability
of specific jurisdiction, its focus was on whether the defendant's contacts with California were
sufficiently related to particular plaintiffs' claims for purposes of specific jurisdiction. See supra
notes 169-176 and accompanying text. There was no dispute that the defendant had established
minimum contacts with California, and that these contacts sufficed with respect to plaintiffs whose
claims arose in California. See supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
192. 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
193. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
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who were injured in Oklahoma while driving a car they purchased in
New York, filed suit in Oklahoma against two New York-based
defendants-a New York car dealership and a New York distributor
that served dealers in the New York City tri-state area. 194 As to those
defendants, the "stream of commerce" ended in New York; they did not
in any sense seek to serve the Oklahoma market. 19 5
The Court revisited the stream of commerce several years later
in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, with the Court splitting
4-4-1 on whether a Japanese component manufacturer-whose tire
valves were used in a tire tube that was manufactured in Taiwan but
found its way onto a motorcycle purchased in California-had
established minimum contacts with California. 196 Justice Brennan's
four-Justice coalition found that the minimum contacts requirement
was met, noting World- Wide Volkswagen's instruction above. 197 Justice
O'Connor's four-Justice coalition disagreed, reasoning that "placement
of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of
the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State."19 8 Rather,
there must be "[a] dditional conduct" indicating "an intent or purpose to
serve the market in the forum State." 199 Examples of such additional
conduct include "designing the product for the market in the forum
State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for
providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing
the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales
agent in the forum State." 200

194. Id. at 298-99.
195. See id. at 298; see also John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdictionin a Global World: The
Impact of the Supreme Court'sDecisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1707, 1735 (2013) ("The stream ended when the New York car dealer sold the car to the
plaintiff in New York.").
196. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
197. Id. at 119-20 (Brennan, J., concurring):
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor ... is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve,
directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable
to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there
been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not exceed its
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
198. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion).
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Justice Stevens declined to join either the Brennan or O'Connor
opinions, depriving the Court of a majority opinion on the minimum
contacts question. 201 A majority did, however, conclude that jurisdiction
over the Japanese manufacturer would be unreasonable under the
second-prong of the jurisdictional test. 202 But this holding was premised
on the unusual posture of Asahi-the case involved only a claim by the
Taiwanese tube manufacturer for indemnification from the Japanese
component manufacturer. 2 0 3 Asahi's reasoning on this point strongly
indicates that a direct action by the injured in-state plaintiff against
the Japanese manufacturer would not have failed the reasonableness
prong. 204
Accordingly, Asahi's lack of a majority opinion on the minimum
contacts questions left considerable uncertainty regarding how to
approach the most typical stream-of-commerce situation-where an
injured plaintiff sues an up-stream defendant in the state where the
product was ultimately purchased and caused injury. 205 State and
federal courts took different sides on the Brennan-O'Connor split, but,
there was no conclusive resolution.206
In terms of clarifying the governing principles, the 2011
McIntyre decision fared no better than Asahi. It is incorrect, however,
201. See id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("An examination of minimum contacts is not
always necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is
constitutional." (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78) (1985))).
202. See id. at 113-14 (opinion of the Court) (noting "the unreasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction over Asahi, even apart from the question of the placement of goods in the stream of
commerce"); see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonableness
factors).
203. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 ("All that remains is a claim for indemnification asserted by
Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese corporation, against Asahi.").
204. For example, the Asahi Court recognized that "often the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien
defendant." Id. Those interests were "slight" in an indemnification action between two foreign
companies, but they would be quite strong in a claim by a California plaintiff injured in California.
See id. (noting that "Cheng Shin has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to litigate
its indemnification claim against Asahi in California rather than in Taiwan or Japan" and that
"[blecause the plaintiff is not a California resident, California's legitimate interests in the dispute
have considerably diminished"). Indeed, the Court had explained just a few years before Asahi
that "[a] State generally has a 'manifest interest' in providing its residents with a convenient forum
for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (quoting
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
205. See 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1067.4, at 481 ("The Asahi Court's
four to four division on the scope of the stream of commerce principle left matters in somewhat of
a muddle.").
206. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Aerohawk Aviation, Inc., 259 F. Supp.
2d 1096, 1105 (D. Idaho 2003) (noting that "the circuits have split over whether to follow Justice
O'Connor or Justice Brennan's articulation of the 'stream of commerce' theory"); see also 4 WRIGHT,
MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1067.4, at 478-96 (citing cases).
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to read McIntyre as requiring a more restrictive approach. Although
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion rejected Justice Brennan's
invocation of World- Wide Volkswagen's "stream of commerce" language
in Asahi, 207 that view did not garner five votes. If any opinion qualifies
as the Court's holding in McIntyre, it would be Justice Breyer's
concurrence. 208 And Justice Breyer explicitly disagreed with the
plurality opinion's legal analysis, particularly its emphasis on the
defendant's "inten[t] to submit to the power of a sovereign" and whether
the defendant can "be said to have targeted the forum." 2 0 9 Justice
Breyer's concurrence did not take a position on the deadlock between
Justice Brennan and O'Connor in Asahi,2 10 but rather found that the
plaintiff had not even met the burden of establishing that the British
manufacturer had delivered its goods in the stream of commerce " 'with
the expectation that they will be purchased' by New Jersey users." 2 11
As mentioned earlier, the McIntyre concurrence was premised
on a very restrictive understanding of the factual record. 212 Justices
Breyer and Alito assumed that these were the only facts offered in
support of jurisdiction:
(1) The American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one machine to a New
Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's employer, Mr. Curcio; (2) the British
Manufacturer permitted, indeed wanted, its independent American Distributor to sell its

207. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882-83 (2011) (plurality opinion).
208. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng'g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 178-79 (5th Cir. 2013) ("In
McIntyre, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, furnished the narrowest
grounds for the decision and controls here."); AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d
1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Because McIntyre did not produce a majority opinion, we must follow
the narrowest holding among the plurality opinions in that case. The narrowest holding is that
which can be distilled from Justice Breyer's concurrence ..... (citation omitted)). These opinions
strive to identify the binding holding of McIntyre using what is known as the Marks rule, which
instructs that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."' Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)). Although there are some interesting unresolved
questions regarding how exactly one identifies the "narrowest ground" for purposes of Marks, there
is no plausible understanding of Marks under which courts would be bound to reject personal
jurisdiction solely because Justice Kennedy's McIntyre plurality would deem the defendant's
contacts insufficient. For a summary of competing approaches to the Marks rule, see Richard M.
2018),
REV.
(forthcoming
L.
132
HARv.
Rule,
the
Marks
Re,
Beyond
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3090620 [https://perma.cc/N55G-WW68]; Adam Steinman, Nonmajority
Opinions and Biconditional Rules, 128 YALE L.J. F. 1, 2 (2018) (summarizing competing
approaches to Marks); Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: PluralityDecisions and Precedential
Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017).
209. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id. at 889 (citing all three Asahi opinions).
211. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)).
212. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
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machines to anyone in America willing to buy them; and (3) representatives of the British
Manufacturer attended trade shows in "such cities as Chicago, Las Vegas, New Orleans,
Orlando, San Diego, and San Francisco." 2 1 3

This narrow reading of the facts excised J. McIntyre's deliberate
goal of accessing the entire U.S. market for its products. Justice
Ginsburg recognized that J. McIntyre had "engag[ed]" a U.S.
distributor in order "to promote and sell its machines in the United
States," 214 and had taken "purposeful step[s] to reach customers for its
products 'anywhere in the United States.' "215 Justice Breyer, by
contrast, saw a defendant who passively "permitted" and "wanted" such
sales to occur. 2 16 Given Justice Breyer's constricted framing of the
relevant facts, it is not surprising that the case failed to meet a
jurisdictional standard that hinges on a defendant's "purpose[ ]."217
Justice Breyer's blinkered view of the record also explains his
conclusion that J. McIntyre had not even "delivered its goods in the
stream of commerce 'with the expectation that they will be purchased'
by New Jersey users." 218 Indeed, Justice Breyer left open the possibility
that jurisdiction would have been proper if the record had contained
either (1) evidence of "the size and scope of New Jersey's scrap-metal
business," 2 19 (2) a "list of potential New Jersey customers who
might ... have regularly attended [the] trade shows" that J. McIntyre
officials attended, 220 or (3) evidence of more than a single sale to a single
New Jersey customer. 22 1
By recognizing that such facts could permit New Jersey to
exercise jurisdiction, the logic of Justice Breyer's McIntyre opinion fits
quite neatly with Justice Ginsburg's idea that minimum contacts are
established when a defendant "seek[s] to exploit a multistate or global

213. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach.
Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 578-79 (N.J. 2010)).
214. Id. at 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 898.
216. Id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 891 (describing the "constitutional demand for 'minimum contacts' and 'purposefu[1]
avail[ment]'" (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 297 (1980))).
218. Id. at 889 (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).
219. Id. (noting these as "other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of
jurisdiction"); cf. id. at 895 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using 2008 data on scrap metal recycling in
New Jersey and indicating that New Jersey facilities processed over two million tons of scrap metal
in 2008, which was the largest of all the states by a substantial margin).
220. Id. at 889 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[Nicastro] has introduced no list of potential New
Jersey customers who might, for example, have regularly attended trade shows."); cf. id. at 895
n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing a 2011 member directory listing nearly one hundred New
Jersey businesses as belonging to the industry group that sponsored the trade shows).
221. Id. at 888-89 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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market" that includes the forum state. 2 2 2 The concurring opinion simply
indicated that a plaintiff must show that there would likely be potential
customers in the forum. That is why it would matter whether the record
contained a "list of potential New Jersey customers who might . . . have

regularly attended [the] trade shows" that J. McIntyre officials
attended, 22 3 or information regarding "the size and scope of New
Jersey's scrap-metal business," 22 4 or evidence of an actual sale to an

additional New Jersey customer. 225 Such evidence would reveal the
existence of a market for the defendant's product in New Jersey and
thus create an expectation of purchases by New Jersey consumers.
Again, the concurring opinion did not rule out the possibility that
jurisdiction would have been proper if it had been "shown that the
British Manufacturer . .. delivered its goods in the stream of commerce
'with the expectation that they will be purchased' by New Jersey
users."2 2 6 It simply concluded that no such expectation is created when
there is only a single sale of the defendant's product to a customer in
the forum state, and there is no other evidence in the record suggesting
potential customers in the forum state. 227
Accordingly, Justice Breyer's McIntyre concurrence is consistent
with an understanding of personal jurisdiction that would not allow
distant manufacturers who profit from sales in the forum state to
222. Id. at 910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 889 (Breyer, J., concurring).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 888 (stating that the Court "has strongly suggested that a single sale of a product
in a State does not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant").
226. Id. at 889 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)).
Some courts have emphasized Justice Breyer's point that "the relevant facts found by the New
Jersey Supreme Court show 'no regular . . . flow' or 'regular course' of sales in New Jersey." Id.
Justice Breyer's concurrence does not, however, state that these are necessary for jurisdiction.
Although a regular flow or course of sales in New Jersey would have been sufficient for jurisdiction,
the concurrence also made clear that Mr. Nicastro might also have "otherwise shown that the
British Manufacturer . . . delivered its goods in the stream of commerce 'with the expectation that
they will be purchased' by New Jersey users." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).
227. It is possible, for example, that a defendant may seek to serve the U.S. market as a whole,
but the economics are such that a market for the defendant's products exists only in some states.
For example, "[a] manufacturer of grapefruit-harvesting equipment might engage a distributor to
access the entire U.S. market, but that would not necessarily create an expectation of purchases
by users in Alaska, North Dakota, or other states where grapefruit are not harvested." Adam N.
Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 512 (2012). If one accepts the premise that the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant, see Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982) (noting the plaintiffs "burden of proof' when a
defendant challenges personal jurisdiction), the plaintiff might have to provide evidence to confirm
that a potential market existed in the forum state.
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escape jurisdiction in those states when their products cause damage
there. Nor would it give manufacturers a free pass to avoid jurisdiction
simply because their products are sold via a distribution scheme that
seeks out the U.S. market as a whole rather than each individual state.
B. Intentional Torts
The other recent Supreme Court decision that hinges on the
basic minimum contacts requirement was its 2014 decision in Walden
v. Fiore.228 Walden was based on an intentional tort-specifically the
preparation of a false affidavit used to support the forfeiture of funds
seized by the federal government.229 In Walden, two Nevada residents
sued a Georgia police officer who had been acting as a deputized Drug
Enforcement Administration agent at the Atlanta airport. 230 When the
plaintiffs were changing planes in Atlanta en route from Puerto Rico to
Nevada, the defendant and another officer approached them,
questioned them, and ultimately seized $97,000 in cash. 23 1 The
defendant later helped to draft an affidavit, which he forwarded to the.
U.S. Attorney, to show probable cause for the forfeiture of the funds. 232
Ultimately no forfeiture complaint was filed, and the funds were,
returned to the plaintiffs eight months after they had been seized.
The plaintiffs sued the defendant in a Nevada court seeking
damages for violations of their constitutional rights, alleging that thedefendant's drafting of a false affidavit led to a delay in returning the
funds. 233 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that jurisdiction was proper on the basis that the defendant
knew that the probable cause affidavit would affect persons with
significant Nevada connections. 234 Justice Thomas explained that even
when intentional torts are involved, jurisdiction "must be based on
intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary
228. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
229 Id. at 1119.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1119-20. Although Walden was filed in a Nevada federal court, personal
jurisdiction was based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A). See id. at 1121. Accordingly,
personal jurisdiction hinged on whether it would be constitutional for a Nevada state court to
assert personal jurisdiction. See id. ("[I]n order to determine whether the Federal District Court
in this case was authorized to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner, we ask whether the exercise of
jurisdiction 'comports with the limits imposed by federal due process' on the State of Nevada."
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014))); see also supra notes 74-75 and
accompanying text (discussing Rule 4(k)(1)(A)).
234. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124-25 (describing the Ninth Circuit's reasoning).
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contacts with the forum"; "mere injury to a forum resident is not a
sufficient connection to the forum." 2 35

Walden recognized, however, that personal jurisdiction would be
proper over "defendants who have purposefully 'reach[ed] out beyond'
their State and into another," and that "physical presence in the forum
state is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction." 236 Accordingly, Walden left in
place earlier decisions upholding personal jurisdiction in the
intentional tort context. One such case was Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., which unanimously approved jurisdiction in New Hampshire over
a libel claim by a New York plaintiff against Ohio-based Hustler
Magazine. 237 Hustler sold "some 10 to 15,000 copies of [its]
magazine ... each month" in New Hampshire, which was admittedly a
"small portion" of the defendant's nationwide sales. 238 The Keeton Court
reasoned that "[t]he general course of conduct in circulating magazines
throughout the state was purposefully directed at New Hampshire, and
inevitably affected persons in the state." 239 Therefore, such conduct "is
sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based
on the contents of the magazine." 240 The 2014 Walden decision explicitly
reaffirmed Keeton, noting that the defendant had "circulat[ed]
magazines to 'deliberately exploi[t]' a market in the forum State."2 4 1
Another earlier decision was Calder v. Jones, in which
entertainer Shirley Jones-who lived and worked in California-sued
the National Enquirer magazine for libel based on an article asserting
that the plaintiff "drank so heavily as to prevent her from fulfilling her
professional obligations." 2 4 2 Calder unanimously upheld personal
jurisdiction not only over the magazine but also over the individual
employees in Florida who wrote and edited the article. 243 Although the
Court recognized that the employees were not responsible for their
235. Id. at 1123, 1125.
236. Id. at 1122 (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
473 (1985)).
237. 465 U.S. 770, 772 (1984).
238. Id. at 772, 775.
239. Id. at 774 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. at 773-74.
241. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (second alteration in original) (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at
781).
242. 465 U.S. 783, 788 n.9 (1984).
243. Id. at 788-89 (noting that California was "the focal point" of both the allegedly defamatory
story and the harm suffered by the plaintiff, that the article was "drawn from California sources,"
"concerned the California activities of a California resident," and "impugned the professionalism
of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California," and that "the brunt of the
harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional
reputation, was suffered in California").
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employer's circulation and marketing decisions, their own "intentional,
and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California." 2 4 4
They knew that their article "would have a potentially devastating
impact" on the plaintiff, and that "the brunt of that injury would be felt"
in California-where the plaintiff "lives and works and in which the
National Enquirer has its largest circulation." 2 4 5 Walden explicitly
reaffirmed Calder, noting that the individual defendants in that case
based their article "on phone calls to 'California sources,' " "wrote the
story about the plaintiffs activities in California," and "caused
reputational injury in California by writing an allegedly libelous article
that was widely circulated in the State." 246
By contrast, the defendant in Walden had not reached out to
Nevada, nor did he benefit in some way from markets or other activity
in Nevada. The ultimate result in Walden, therefore, hinged on the
particular facts of that case. It did not reflect a more restrictive
approach to personal jurisdiction compared to the Court's earlier case
law.
C. Revisiting the Home-State Scenario
As discussed earlier, one situation where personal jurisdiction
doctrine can thwart access to justice is the home-state scenario: a
plaintiff is injured in her home state, relevant events occur in her home
state, and she seeks remedies from an out-of-state defendant by suing
in the courts of her home state. Under current doctrine, this scenario
falls under the specific jurisdiction umbrella. When a plaintiff is injured
in her home state as a result of events occurring in her home state, a
sufficient "affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying
controversy" 247 certainly exists. 248

244. Id. at 789-90.
245. Id.
246. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286-88 (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89).
247. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at
1136).
248. This scenario should be evaluated under a specific jurisdiction framework regardless of
whether a plaintiff injured by a defendant's product purchased the product in the forum state or
elsewhere. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1787 & n.3 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority had not endorsed "a rigid requirement that a
defendant's in-state conduct must actually cause a plaintiffs claim" and arguing that such a
requirement "might call into question whether even a plaintiff injured in a State by an item
identical to those sold by a defendant in that State could avail himself of that State's courts to
redress his injuries-a result specifically contemplated by World- Wide Volkswagen" (citing Brief
of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors in Support of Respondents 14-18 (No. 16-466))).
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Read carefully, the Court's recent McIntyre and Walden
decisions do not depart from the Court's earlier case law on the
minimum contacts required for specific jurisdiction. Justice Breyer's
tie-breaking McIntyre concurrence referenced the most permissive
regarding out-of-state
aspects of the Court's jurisprudence
manufacturers whose products cause injury in the forum state,
including the notion that jurisdiction is proper over a manufacturer who
"delivered its goods in the stream of commerce 'with the expectation
that they will be purchased'" in the forum state. 249 Walden explicitly
left in place earlier decisions on personal jurisdiction in intentional tort
cases-namely Calder and Keeton, both of which upheld jurisdiction in
states where the defendant's conduct caused injury.250
Furthermore, both McIntyre and Walden arose from fairly
unusual factual situations. In McIntyre, the tie-breaking concurring
opinion adopted an exceptionally narrow view of the evidentiary
record. 251 And in Walden, the underlying events stemmed from the
plaintiffs physically coming to the defendant's home state, rather than
the defendant making contact with the plaintiffs' home state. 252
Accordingly, these decisions do not compel a more restrictive approach
to determining whether an out-of-state defendant has established
minimum contacts with the forum state in the context of specific
jurisdiction.
Insofar as "[t]he primary focus of [the Court's] personal
jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant's relationship to the forum
State," 2 5 3 there will always be some plaintiffs in the home-state scenario
who will be unable to sue every potential defendant in their home-state
courts. This result may be inescapable when the defendant was not
engaged in activities that focus on the forum state and was not
benefiting from activities or markets in the forum state. That may well
have been the case in Walden. The Nevada plaintiffs "reached out" to
the defendant's state (Georgia) rather than vice-versa. And the
defendant's conduct involved events that occurred in Georgia (not
ven though the ultimate consequences of the defendant's
Nevada)
alleged conduct would have been felt by the plaintiffs in Nevada. 254
249. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 889 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)); see supra notes 209-211
and accompanying text; see also AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (concluding that Justice Breyer's concurrence constitutes the McIntyre holding and that
under his opinion "the law remains the same").
250. See supra notes 236-246 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 212-221 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 230-235 and accompanying text.
253. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779.
254. See supra Section III.B.
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That may also have been the case in McIntyre, but only under
the narrow view of the factual record adopted by the concurring
Justices. If there was no evidence of a market for the defendant's
product in the forum state, one might legitimately conclude that the
geographic scope of the defendant's activity did not contact the forum.
In many situations, however, out-of-state defendants benefit-at least
indirectly-from markets for their products in the forum state, even
when they access those markets through distribution mechanisms that
put them further up the "stream of commerce." McIntyre does not
foreclose jurisdiction in cases where the plaintiffs provide evidence
establishing that market and the defendant's economic benefit
therefrom. 255 That sort of relationship would support the conclusion
that-in the words of the only Supreme Court opinion to garner a
majority on this question-the defendant has made "efforts .

.

. to

serve[,] directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States"
and has "deliver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State." 256

255. See supra notes 222-227 and accompanying text. Examples of cases that reflect this
understanding of McIntyre include: Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng'g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 176-79 (5th
Cir. 2013) (finding personal jurisdiction in Mississippi over an Irish manufacturer whose forklifts
were sold to U.S. customers through an Ohio-based distributor despite a lack of "specific
knowledge" of sales in Mississippi, where the product injured a Mississippi resident and sales to
Mississippi customers "accounted for approximately 1.55% of [the manufacturer's] United States
sales"); In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Product Liability, 888 F.3d 753, 779
(5th Cir. 2018) ("[P]1aintiffs need only show that J & J delivered the product that injured them
'into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it would be purchased by or used by
consumers in the forum state.'" (quoting Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 177)); Hilsinger Co. v. FBW Invs.,
LLC, 109 F. Supp. 3d 409, 426-28 (D. Mass. 2015) (finding personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts
in a trademark-infringement action brought by a Massachusetts company against an Arizonabased LLC that sold its products to "national retailers such as Walmart, Sears, and Amazon.com,"
through which "[a]n unknown number-likely thousands-of products were sold ... to consumers
in Massachusetts"); Butler v. JLA Indus. Equip., Inc., 845 N.W.2d 834, 846-47 (Minn. Ct. App.
2014) (finding that McIntyre "reflects a number of principles" including that "the stream-ofcommerce theory is still a viable framework for analyzing whether a nonresident defendant may
be subject to suit in a forum for tort claims relating to the use of its products by resident plaintiffs"
and that "a majority of the justices once again rejected Justice O'Connor's approach to analyzing
minimum contacts under the stream-of-commerce theory"); Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 304
P.3d 18, 29 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) ("[A] manufacturer of an allegedly defective component part that
has ... placed it into a distribution channel with the expectation it will be sold in our national
market cannot be insulated from liability simply because it does not specifically target or know its
products are being marketed in New Mexico."); id. at 33 ("Because J. McIntyre Machinery did not
produce a majority opinion adopting either Justice O'Connor's or Justice Brennan's stream of
commerce theory, and given Justice Breyer's reliance on current United States Supreme Court
precedent, pre-Asahi case law utilizing the approach set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen remains
binding in New Mexico.").
256. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
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IV. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION, GENERAL JURISDICTION, AND RATIONALITY

This Part addresses the test for determining whether a
defendant's contacts with the forum must be assessed using a specific
jurisdiction standard or a general jurisdiction standard. Section A
argues that a case should be evaluated as a specific jurisdiction case
when it would be rational for the forum state to adjudicate the
availability of the requested judicial remedies. Section B explains how
this approach would permit personal jurisdiction in the safety-net and
aggregation scenarios described above. 257 Section C discusses theories
of personal jurisdiction that can be justified on grounds other than this
Article's rationality-focused standard.
A. Rationality as the Touchstone for SeparatingSpecific and General
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has described the line between specific
jurisdiction and general jurisdiction in a variety of ways. Specific
jurisdiction applies when there is "an affiliatio[n] between the forum
and the underlying controversy" 2 58-such as "when the suit 'aris[es] out
of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum' "259 or when
there is "activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State
0
and is therefore subject to the State's regulation." 2 6 The Court has also
stated that "specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of 'issues
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes

jurisdiction.'

"261

What the Court has failed to provide-either in its more recent
round of cases or in earlier precedent-is an underlying theory for

257. See supra Sections II.B-II.C.
258. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at
1136).
259. Id. at 923-24 (alteration in original) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)).
260. Id. at 919. The Court stated that the required "affiliation" is "principally" some "activity
or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's
regulation," id., but it has never-even in its more recent cases-said that such activity or
occurrence is the only sort or "affiliation" that can justify specific jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (stating that "there must be 'an
affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an
occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.'"
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919)).
261. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1136); see
also Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting this language from Goodyear).
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identifying what kind of "affiliation" between the forum and the
underlying controversy is sufficient, or when a suit "relates to" the
defendant's contacts with the forum, or when issues are "connected
with" the controversy that establishes jurisdiction. 2 6 2 This Article
proposes the following answer: A case can be evaluated as a specific
jurisdiction case when it would be rational for the forum state to
adjudicate the availability of the requested judicial remedies. General
jurisdiction, by contrast, is the kind of jurisdiction that exists even
when there is no particular reason for the forum state to adjudicate a
particular dispute.
Viewing the distinction between specific jurisdiction and general
jurisdiction as a function of rationality illuminates why there has been
such strong support on the Supreme Court for constricting the scope of
general jurisdiction. It is hard to see why it would be rational for-as
the Court put it-a Polish driver to bring a design-defect suit in
California against the German manufacturer Daimler AG based on an
accident that occurred in Poland. 263 The very irrationalityof general
jurisdiction-at least with respect to the particular lawsuit at issuemay explain why even Justices who generally favor greater access to
courts and judicial remedies have supported (if not captained) the
recent efforts to narrow general jurisdiction. 2 6 4
By contrast, the existence of a rational basis for the forum to
adjudicate the availability of judicial remedies in a given case provides
the requisite "affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying
controversy" 265 to support specific jurisdiction. This would include cases

262. See Andrews, supra note 58, at 1011 ("The biggest void is the threshold question of
whether the plaintiffs claim is unrelated to the defendant's forum contacts (thereby triggering
general jurisdiction analysis), or related (thereby triggering specific jurisdiction analysis . . ).");
Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in
PersonalJurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 868 (2012) (noting "the fuzziness between
general and specific jurisdiction"); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific
PersonalJurisdiction,62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1620 (2001) ("[T]he Court has never precisely defined
the scope of specific personal jurisdiction."); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text
(describing the lack of guidance on this question from the 2017 Bristol-Myers decision).
263. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121 (2014).
264. That Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan are generally sympathetic to access and
enforcement is confirmed by a recent study that ranked the twenty-one Supreme Court Justices
who served from 1970 to 2013 based on their votes in cases involving "private enforcement (defined
to include access to court)." Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An
InstitutionalApproach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1570 (2014). Justice Ginsburg-who authored the
Court's opinions in Daimler and BNSF-ranked eighth out of twenty-one as voting most often in
favor of private enforcement. Id. at 1572. Justices Breyer and Kagan-who joined Justice
Ginsburg's Daimler and BNSF opinions-ranked ninth and fourth respectively. Id.
265. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1136).
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where there is "activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum
State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation," but it would
also include cases where a state has some other legitimate interest in
the case that makes it rational for that state's courts to exercise
adjudicative authority.266
Using rationality to demarcate the line between specific and
general jurisdiction makes particular sense given that the Court's
jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction is grounded in the Due Process
Clause. 267 Rationality is a well-established component of what "due
process of law" requires. For example, unless legislation is subject to
268 it
heightened scrutiny (such as when it affects fundamental rights),
will comport with the Due Process Clause as long as it is supported by
a rational basis. 269 A rationality standard also coheres with the

266. Cf., e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (describing how,
with respect to substantive choice of law, the existence of "state interests" will "ensure that the
choice of [the forum state's] law is not arbitrary or unfair"); see also infra notes 270-271 and
accompanying text (discussing the constitutional limits on substantive choice-of-law
determinations).
267. Some have criticized the notion that the Supreme Court's limits on personal jurisdiction
are properly rooted in the Due Process Clause, arguing that jurisdictional limits ought to be either
abandoned entirely, allocated to other constitutional provisions, or treated as sub-constitutional
law. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the ConstitutionalLaw of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 20 (1990) ("I believe the
Court should. . . abandon the notion that state court personal jurisdiction is a matter of
constitutional law . . . ."); Erbsen, supra note 2, at 68 (noting that "alternative sources might exist"
to the Due Process Clause); Sachs, supra note 2, at 1252:
Personal jurisdiction isn't a matter of constitutional law, or even of federal law. Instead,
it's a matter of general law-that unwritten law, including much of the English common
law and the customary law of nations, that formed the basis of the American legal
system and that continues to govern unusual corners of the system today.;
Weinstein, supra note 2, at 172 ("[L]imitations on state court jurisdiction stem[] not from the Due
Process Clause, or any other provision protecting individuals from untoward assertions of state
power, but from federal common law rules . . . ."). Although these critiques merit consideration,
this Article accepts the premise-whether correct or not-that the Due Process Clause imposes
limits on a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.
268. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) ("The [Due Process]
Clause . . . provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests.").
269. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84-85 (1978)
("It is by now well established that [such] legislative Acts ... come to the Court with a presumption
of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to
establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 428 U.S. 1, 15
(1976))); Cleland v. Nat'l Coll. of Bus., 435 U.S. 213, 219 (1978) (rejecting due process challenge to
restrictions on the educational courses for which veterans' benefits are available under the GI Bill
because "[ilt was not irrational for Congress to conclude that" the restrictions "would minimize the
risk that[] veterans' benefits would be wasted on educational programs of little value");
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (finding that a regulation violates
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Supreme Court's approach to other areas of law where the permissible
reach of a state's sovereign power is tested. Consider, specifically,
constitutional constraints on choice of law-which are themselves
grounded in the Due Process Clause. 270 A state has the authority to
apply its own substantive law to a particular dispute as long as applying
its law "is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 271
This Article's proposal is not alone in seeking to bring general
due process principles to bear on personal jurisdiction. 2 7 2 It is distinct,
however, in that it would not eliminate the basic requirement that a
defendant must establish minimum contacts with the forum state.
Others have argued that the minimum contacts inquiry should be
jettisoned because it is irrelevant to such due process values as avoiding
"injustice or undue harm to the individual litigant," 273 or "protect[ing]
against arbitrary assertions of governmental power." 2 7 4 This Article's
proposal, by contrast, preserves current doctrine's core requirement of
minimum contacts. It embraces the due process notion of rationality
merely to inform the crucial line between specific and generaljurisdiction. Rather than overhauling the existing doctrinal framework,
a focus on remedial rationality provides a sensible approach to.

due process only when it "has no rational relation" to its objective); United States v. Carolene Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938):
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
See generally, e.g., Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process,
ProceduralDue Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 841 (2003) (describing the
aspect of substantive due process "that prohibits 'irrational' governmental conduct").
270. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (noting that
constitutional constraints on choice of law derive from both the Due Process Clause and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause).
271. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 818; Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308; see also, e.g., Louise
Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance:Due Processand Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1057, 1061-62 (2013) (citing Phillips as establishing the principle that "the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause controls irrational state choices of law").
272. See infra notes 273-274 and accompanying text.
273. See Redish, supra note 2, at 1133; see also id. at 1115 (arguing against "the 'minimum
contacts' test['s] ... concern for prelitigation contacts" (footnote omitted)).
274. See Spencer, supra note 2, at 634 (arguing for replacing the minimum contacts
requirement with an inquiry into "what is indeed a proper due process limitation on jurisdiction:
state assertions of jurisdiction may not be arbitrary"); see also Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two
Jurisdictions,68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 504-05 (2015) (arguing for "a ... theory of jurisdiction based
on the concept of nonarbitrariness" and recognizing that under this theory "there is a point at
which the connection between a lawsuit and the forum is so strong that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction is permissible even if the defendant has no connection to the forum").
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identifying when the required "affiliatio[n] between the forum and the
underlying controversy" exists. 27 5
To be clear, the existence of a rational basis for the forum state
to adjudicate a particular lawsuit would not be sufficient by itself to
permit personal jurisdiction. Rather, satisfying this rationality
requirement means that the constitutionality of jurisdiction should be
evaluated as a matter of specific jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction would
be constitutional where both (1) the defendant has established
minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) jurisdiction would be
"reasonable" in light of various factors the Court has identified. 276
Failing to satisfy one of these two requirements would preclude
jurisdiction even if it would be rational for the forum to adjudicate the
case. Consider, for example, World-Wide Volkswagen. 2 77 There was
surely a rational basis for an Oklahoma court to adjudicate claims
arising from an accident that occurred in Oklahoma. But Oklahoma
nonetheless lacked personal jurisdiction over the two local New York
defendants-a car dealership and distributor that served only New
York-area markets-because they did not themselves have minimum
contacts with Oklahoma. 278
275. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at
1136).
276. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (describing the requirements for specific
jurisdiction). There may be some overlap between the rationality inquiry proposed by this Article
and the second-step reasonableness inquiry required in specific jurisdiction cases. For example,
the reasonableness of jurisdiction depends in part on "the forum State's interest in adjudicating
the dispute," World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980), which is
certainly relevant to this Article's rationality inquiry. They may be distinct in some respects,
however. As discussed infra note 278, in some situations a state may have a rational basis to
adjudicate a particular case but the burden such litigation would impose on a particular defendant
may make jurisdiction unreasonable.
277. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text (discussing the World-Wide Volkswagen
case).
278. See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text. Or consider a hypothetical "small
Egyptian shirt maker," "Brazilian manufacturing cooperative," or "Kenyan coffee farmer" whose
products reach the United States "through international distributors." J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 892 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing these examples). Ifa product
manufactured by such a defendant injures a consumer in the United States, it would be rational
for the state where the injury occurred to adjudicate the lawsuit. And depending on the
circumstances, one could plausibly argue that such a defendant has made minimum contacts with
that state insofar as it "delivered its goods in the stream of commerce 'with the expectation that
they will be purchased' by" users in the forum state. Id. at 889 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 298); see also supra notes 222-227 and accompanying text (explaining that such
activity by a defendant can still satisfy the minimum contacts requirement). It might still be
unreasonable, however, to assert personal jurisdiction in light of the burden on such a defendant.
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (stating that "[a] court
must consider the burden on the defendant" as one of "several factors" relevant to "the
determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an
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The inquiry into rationality for this purpose will not necessarily
be identical to the rationality tests that govern other areas of due
process. 27 9 Ultimately, courts would be asking a distinct question
regarding the rationality of adjudication in a particular forum, which
may not map precisely onto these other doctrinal areas. So it is possible
that rationality for personal jurisdiction purposes would be a more
stringent requirement than one would typically see in, say,
constitutional rational basis jurisprudence. 2 8 0 Indeed, there are some
contexts where rationality connotes more careful scrutiny. A court is
permitted to grant summary judgment only when a rationalfact finder
could not render judgment for the nonmoving party. 281 Yet, for better or
worse, courts have claimed for themselves fairly broad power to grant
summary judgment on the basis that it would be irrational or
unreasonable for a fact finder to reach a particular verdict. 282
Put another way, this proposal does not necessarily dictate an
especially deferential form of rationality review. Even in the context of
constitutional challenges to substantive legislation, courts and
commentators have identified a "rational basis with bite" standard that,.
operates in some situations. 28 3 The key point is that the decision to
evaluate a case under the specific jurisdiction rubric should entail a
pragmatic inquiry into the reasons for adjudicating a specific case in a

evaluation of several factors"); see also Steinman, supra note 227, at 513-14 (arguing that Justice
Breyer's concern that "[i]t may be fundamentally unfair" to permit jurisdiction over such
defendants in the United States "could be vindicated ... by using the reasonableness prong of the
Court's jurisdictional doctrine").
279. See, e.g., infra notes 296-299 and accompanying text (discussing how rationality in the
context of personal jurisdiction in multistate class actions would differ from rationality in the
context of choice of law in multistate class actions).
280. One often finds rational basis review described as "toothless." E.g., In re Agnew, 144 F.3d
1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 1998); H. Jefferson Powell, ReasoningAbout the Irrational:The Roberts Court
and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 248 (2011) ("Williamson-style
rational-basis review is virtually toothless.").
281. E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) ("Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,
there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Az. v Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.
253, 270 (1968))).
282. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)).
283. See, e.g., CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1069 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (observing that the presence of "an arguable First Amendment interest" would warrant
a "more exacting [form] of rational basis review (which some commentators have labeled 'rational
basis with bite'), which requires an examination of actual state interests and whether the
challenged law actually furthers that interest rather than the traditional rational basis review
which permits a law to be upheld if rationally related to any conceivable interest" (citations
omitted) (citing, for example, Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1099 (10th Cir. 2014))).
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specific forum. 284 As explained below, this inquiry should include an
assessment of alternative forums and consider the extent to which
obstacles to personal jurisdiction can deprive plaintiffs of any adequate
alternative forum-as can be the case in the safety-net and aggregation
scenarios. Using rationality as an overarching standard accounts for
these situations by recognizing that personal jurisdiction can be
rational in a particular forum precisely because denying personal
jurisdiction would thwart access to justice due to the lack of viable
alternatives. Therefore, as explained in the next Section, it has the
capacity to address the access-to-justice concerns identified in this
Article.
B. Rationality and Access to Justice
Of the three access-to-justice concerns described earlier, the
home-state scenario is undoubtedly assessed under a specific
jurisdiction standard. And as described in Part III, a sensible approach
to the minimum contacts requirement will, in most situations, permit a
plaintiff who is injured in his or her home state to file suit there. The
other two areas of concern-the safety-net scenario and the aggregation
scenario-involve defendants who have significant contacts with the
forum, but who would not qualify for general jurisdiction under the
Supreme Court's new case law. In these situations, the viability of
personal jurisdiction depends entirely on whether the specific
jurisdiction or the general jurisdiction standard applies. The rationality

284. This inquiry would be more expansive than approaches that have been embraced by some
courts and commentators. Professor Lea Brilmayer, for example, proposed a test that hinges on
the "substantive relevance" of the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Brilmayer, supra note
2, at 1452. If the defendant's contacts either are "part of the substantive story underlying the
dispute" or-under a more restrictive approach-are legally relevant to the dispute under the
applicable rules of law, then the specific jurisdiction rubric applies. Id. at 1454-55 (proposing both
a "weak version," which "treats as 'related' any facts that are properly part of the story" and a
"strong version," which "requires that the applicable rules of law actually make the contact in
question one of substantive relevance"). Professor Mary Twitchell has argued that specific
jurisdiction could be proper "when a defendant's forum conduct is similar to, but not causally
related to, the conduct that forms the basis for the cause of action." Twitchell, supranote 2, at 660.
Others have framed the inquiry in terms of causation, allowing specific jurisdiction if the
defendant's contacts with the forum state are either a "but-for" or, alternatively, a "proximate"
cause of the plaintiffs claim against the defendant. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 58, at 1028-29
(describing the "but-for" and "proximate cause" tests used in various federal courts). Professor
Andrews has proposed a "midlevel causation" test, which requires "a 'meaningful link' between the
defendant's forum contact and the claim." Id. at 1042 (quoting O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co.,
496 F.3d 312, 324 (3d Cir. 2007)). These inquiries might potentially inform whether, under this
Article's approach, it would be rational for the forum state to exercise its adjudicative authority.
But they would not be the exclusive means of doing so.
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inquiry developed in the preceding Section provides a workable
solution.
As discussed above, there may be some circumstances where
there is a significant interest in providing a U.S. forum even when all
of the relevant conduct occurred abroad-such as when "a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind" would otherwise escape
accountability. 2 85 That interest would provide a rational basis for
providing a remedy for such international law violations as long as the
defendant had made purposeful contacts with the forum state-even if
the basis for the lawsuit did not hinge on those contacts. 286
The Court's recent decisions on general jurisdiction do not
consider this kind of argument. The claims in Daimler were brought
under the Alien Tort Statute 287-which might indeed be a vehicle for
claims against "torturer[s] or other common enem[ies] of mankind." 288
The plaintiffs in Daimler, however, did not attempt to justify
jurisdiction on the basis that a strong interest existed for allowing
Daimler AG to be sued in the United States, or that foreign legal
systems would be inadequate for considering the Daimler plaintiffs'.
claims.
The safety-net scenario might apply in other situations as well.
Consider Minholz v. Lockheed Martin Corp., where the plaintiff sued
Lockheed Martin in New York based on injuries suffered in
Antarctica. 289 Because the defendant was a Maryland corporation, the
district court ruled that general jurisdiction was not permitted in New

285. See supra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
286. Some interesting federalism dimensions may be present when individual states (say,
California or Massachusetts) act in service of international law norms. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (finding that a Massachusetts statute restricting
state contracts with companies doing business with Burma was preempted by a federal sanctions
regime). Absent federal preemption, however, states have a legitimate interest in providing
remedies for violations of international law. See Davis & Whytock, supra note 146, at 404-05
(describing a "state's interest in exercising its remedial authority to provide redress for the victims
of human rights violations" and arguing that "wrongs involved in many human rights
cases ... may be redressed through relief under state law in federal courts, or in state courts under
state or foreign tort law or under international law"). With respect to cases that proceed in federal
court under the ATS, personal jurisdiction can be based on Rule 4(k)(2). See supra note 121. The
constitutionality of Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction is governed by the Fifth Amendment, see supra notes
76-79 and accompanying text, for which the interests of the United States as a whole (rather than
any particular state) would be relevant. As discussed above, however, the ATS does not give federal
courts carte blanche to assert universal jurisdiction regarding international law violations; the
Supreme Court has placed considerable restrictions on which sort of international law norms are
enforceable through a federal cause of action. See supra note 156.
287. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014).
288. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 127 (Breyer, J., concurring).
289. 227 F. Supp. 3d 249, 261-62 (N.D.N.Y. 2016).
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York under the Supreme Court's recent case law. 29 0 Although the court
recognized that "Antarctica does not have a judicial system which would
allow Plaintiff to bring her action where she was injured," it found that
the plaintiff could simply "sue in a location that could exercise general
personal jurisdiction over Lockheed Martin-presumably the State of
Maryland." 291 One could imagine, however, a variant on Minholz where
events occurring in Antarctica gave rise to a claim against a foreign
defendant with significant activities in New York, but for whom a
lawsuit in the defendant's home country would not be adequate. Courts
already inquire into the adequacy of foreign judicial systems in the
context of forum non conveniens. 29 2 In a case where there is no viable
general jurisdiction alternative-and no adequate judicial system
where the injury occurred-a safety net in New York (or some other
state) could be necessary to provide access to judicial relief. The lack of
an adequate foreign forum can create a rational basis for a U.S. court
to exercise personal jurisdiction.
This Article's theory can also address the aggregation
scenario. 293 There is a range of ways a rationality inquiry might apply
to aggregation, with some facilitating aggregation more than others. At
a minimum, asserting personal jurisdiction over an aggregated
proceeding would be rational when the costs of litigation make such
aggregation necessary to feasibly enforce the governing law and obtain
judicial remedies. 294 Some, admittedly, have read the Court's BristolMyers decision to prevent courts in one state from invoking specific
jurisdiction with respect to claims by plaintiffs injured in other
states. 295 But Bristol-Myers did not consider the possibility that
aggregation beyond the claims of in-state plaintiffs might be necessary
to make the claims of in-state plaintiffs economically viable. There was
no need for the Court to explicitly confront that theory in Bristol-Myers.
Neither the plaintiffs nor the California Supreme Court made that
argument. And the particular claims at issue in Bristol-Myers may not
have been the sort of negative-value claims that require aggregation (or
at least not nationwide aggregation) in order to be effectively litigated.
Accordingly, Bristol-Myers does not foreclose the possibility that the
290. Id. at 261-62.
291. Id. at 262.
292. See supranote 153 (describing how courts, in the context of forum non conveniens, inquire
whether a foreign forum is an adequate alternative).
293. See supra Section II.C.
294. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 1948, 2018 WL 2238191, at *10 (N.D.
Ill. May 16, 2018) (recognizing the argument that Bristol-Myers prevents a plaintiff from
"assert[ing] claims on behalf of either a nationwide or multistate class"); see also supra notes 162176 and accompanying text (describing Bristol-Myers).
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need for aggregation to facilitate the claims of in-state plaintiffs can
create a rational basis for joining a broader group of claims in a single
proceeding.
Parenthetically, this situation illustrates how rationality might
operate differently for personal jurisdiction than it does for other
aspects of due process, such as substantive choice of law. One of the
Supreme Court's leading cases on substantive choice of law-Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts-involved a class action on behalf of plaintiffs
from multiple states that was brought in Kansas state court against a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Oklahoma. 296 The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutionally
arbitrary for Kansas courts to apply Kansas substantive law to all class
members' claims. 2 9 7 With respect to choice of law, it is hard to see why
a court would have a rational interest in applying substantive Kansas
law to claims that have no connection to Kansas. There is no practical
impediment to a Kansas court applying different states' laws to
different claims based on where the relevant events for each plaintiff
occurred. That is, all class members' claims might proceed in Kansas
court, but the court would apply Oklahoma law to Oklahoma plaintiffs,
Texas law to the Texas plaintiffs, and so on.298 Personal jurisdiction is'
different. Where broad aggregation in a single forum is necessary for
claims to be economically viable, 299 that can provide a rational basis for
some court to have jurisdiction over an aggregated proceeding that
includes claims by out-of-state plaintiffs.

296. 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985).
297. Id. at 822 ("[A]pplication of Kansas law to every claim in this case is sufficiently arbitrary
and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits.").
298. Some courts, admittedly, have refused to certify class actions in part because class
members' claims would be subject to different states' substantive laws. See, e.g., Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 in part because the district court "failed to perform its duty to determine
whether the class action would be manageable in light of state law variations"). Although
particular judges and judicial systems may differ over whether variations in state law should
preclude class certification, it is surely not impossible for aggregated proceedings to account for
such variations. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that,
despite "variances in products liability among the jurisdictions, . . . plaintiffs have made a
creditable showing, which apparently satisfied the district court, that class certification does not
present insuperable obstacles"). Whether a class action is permissible under a given state's
procedural law (or under a federal court's approach to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23) is a
distinct question. The issue here is: Assuming the governing procedural law would allow
aggregation (either through a class action or some other joinder device), does the personal
jurisdiction inquiry make aggregation impossible?
299. See supra note 161 (describing how aggregation can be necessary to make low-value
claims economically viable).
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The rationality inquiry might also consider the nature of
particular aggregated proceedings. In a prescient article on this subject,
Professor Diane Wood (now Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit) drew a
distinction between "joinder" and "representational" class actions.3 00
The joinder variant of a class action is merely "a straightforward device
for bringing together similarly situated persons for the adjudication of
common claims." 30 1 In the representational variant, however, the
cohesiveness of the class and the alignment of interests between the
representative and the absent class members justify treating the named
representative as truly acting on behalf of the class as a whole. 302 For a
representational class action, the "specific jurisdictional links with the
named plaintiff alone" could support personal jurisdiction with respect
to the entire class, at least insofar as one accepts the "public law
litigation" model of class actions. 30 3
This theory might apply, for example, to money damages class
actions with low-value individual claims-personal jurisdiction vis-avis the named plaintiff could be sufficient for the entire class. 3 0 4 As
Chief Judge Wood explained: "The defendant might not be enthusiastic
about defending a claim for hundreds of thousands of dollars, rather
than hundreds of dollars, but this is basically a convenience argument
as long as one is satisfied that the forum is proper for the principal
suit." 3 0 5 A similar approach could support personal jurisdiction in class

300. Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdictionand Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 599 (1987).
In addition to anticipating the complicated questions courts are now wrestling with in the wake of
Bristol-Myers, she predicted almost perfectly the Supreme Court's recent moves on general
jurisdiction. See id. at 614 ("The point of general jurisdiction theory is to permit suit in the
defendant's 'home'-the one or two places where a person or entity has settled.").
301. Id.
302. Id. at 599, 601 (writing that the representational model "treats the class action as a
unique species of lawsuit, in which a properly qualified representative may appear in court on
behalf of others" and that "[t]he degree to which a court ought to move from the representational
model toward the joinder approach is a function of the cohesiveness of the class before the court").
303. Id. at 617.
304. See id. at 616 ("If a small-stakes money damage class action is properly treated as a pure
representational action, which the theory of public law litigation suggests it is, then the contacts
supporting the individual's claim against the defendants should support the entire class's
claims."); id. at 621 ("Public law small claim class actions for damages are probably best viewed as
purely representational. . . ."); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct.
1773, 1789 n.4 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ('The Court today does not confront the question
whether its opinion here would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff injured in the forum
State seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there." (citing
Wood, supra note 300, at 616-17)).
305. Wood, supra note 300, at 616. Using the facts of Shutts as an example, Chief Judge Wood
wrote that a low-value individual claim based on a Kansas lease brought by a Kansas named
plaintiff "would be less about the recovery of the $100 related to the Kansas lease than about
private attorney general enforcement of the oil and gas regulatory scheme" and that "[t]he
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claims for injunctive relief.30 6 Put more generally, "the cohesiveness of

the class, the practical difficulties posed by piecemeal litigation, and the
frequent public law character of the claim could justify what would
otherwise be an impermissible expansion of one specific jurisdiction
claim to many other unrelated claims." 307
A rationality inquiry might also be satisfied in a broader
universe of cases in light of the efficiencies that aggregation can
provide. That is, where a court has jurisdiction over a defendant in a
lawsuit involving a certain course of conduct, it is rational to adjudicate
claims for remedies arising from that same conduct. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recognized this explicitly in the Keeton case discussed
earlier. 308 The Court found that New Hampshire had jurisdiction to
award damages arising from the distribution of allegedly defamatory
magazines throughout the United States, even though only a "small
portion" of the defendant's magazines were sold in New Hampshire. 309
It was proper to require the defendant "to answer to a multistate libel
action in New Hampshire," 310 because New Hampshire had not only a
legitimate interest in redressing injuries that occur within the State,
through "the deception of its citizens" 311 but also "a substantial interest
in cooperating with other States ... to provide a forum for efficiently'
litigating all issues and damage claims arising out of a libel in a unitary
proceeding." 3 1 2
Reconciling Keeton and Bristol-Myers is a bit of a challenge. As
Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Bristol-Myers dissent, the logic of
Keeton would seem to support jurisdiction in a multistate proceeding
like Bristol-Myers.31 3 California has jurisdiction with respect to claims

absentees all share the same interest in Phillips' adherence to proper legal standards of behavior,
and they are all aggrieved by deviations from that standard, wherever they occur." Id. at 616 n.50.
306. Id. at 617 ("Pure representational actions for injunctive relief would be analyzed in the
same way, with the propriety of resting the entire suit on the specific jurisdictional links with the
named plaintiff alone depending on the extent to which the public law litigation model is
accepted.").
307. Id. at 618.
308. See supra notes 237-240 and accompanying text.
309. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984).
310. Id. at 777-78.
311. Id. at 776.
312. Id. at 777. The Keeton case did recognize that it would be a question of New Hampshire
law whether the plaintiff could recover for damages resulting from the deception of out-of-state
readers. Id. at 778 n.9 ("The actual applicability of the 'single publication rule' in the peculiar
circumstances of this case is a matter of substantive law, not personal jurisdiction.").
313. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur decision in
Keeton suggests that there should be no such barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction here." (citation
omitted)).
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by plaintiffs injured in California, and its interest in efficiently
litigating damages claims arising from BMS's common course of
conduct would justify jurisdiction with respect to claims by out-of-state
plaintiffs. Justice Alito wrote in Bristol-Myers, however, that Keeton
"concerned jurisdiction to determine the scope of a claim involving instate injury and injury to residents of the State, not, as in this case,
jurisdiction to entertain claims involving no in-state injury and no
injury to residents of the forum State." 3 1 4 Yet Justice Alito did not

explain why this distinction matters for purposes of personal
jurisdiction. 3 15 When a defendant's conduct causes injuries in multiple
states, what difference does it make whether one plaintiff or many
plaintiffs seek remedies for those injuries? In Keeton, it was not the
distribution of magazines in New Hampshire that caused injuries in
California or Texas. But because the defendant's liability hinged on the
same conduct-the allegedly defamatory story-there was no
jurisdictional impediment to vindicating even those injuries suffered
outside New Hampshire.
It would be rather strange, in fact, to make each plaintiffs claim
the crucial unit for which specific jurisdiction must exist. Focusing on
conduct makes more sense given that the "[tihe primary focus of our
personal jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant's relationship to the
forum State." 3 1 6 Indeed, to treat each plaintiffs claim as an independent
unit that must independently qualify for specific jurisdiction is contrary
to the way courts conceptualize jurisdiction in other contexts. Article III
of the Constitution, for example, permits jurisdiction over claims that
lack an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction
provided those claims arise "from a common nucleus of operative fact"
with claims that do fall within one of the categories authorized by
Article 111.317 This includes claims by additional plaintiffs, even when
those plaintiffs have no claims that would independently satisfy Article
111.318 The same logic should apply to personal jurisdiction. When the
314. Id. at 1782 (majority opinion).
315. Id. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting):
The majority today dismisses Keeton on the ground that the defendant there faced one
plaintiffs claim arising out of its nationwide course of conduct, whereas Bristol-Myers
faces many more plaintiffs' claims. But this is a distinction without a difference: In
either case, a defendant will face liability in a single State for a single course of conduct
that has impact in many States.
(citation omitted).
316. Id. at 1779 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
317. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
318. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012) ("Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties."); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
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claims of all plaintiffs arise from a common nucleus of operative fact
regarding the defendant's conduct, personal jurisdiction should be
permissible regarding all plaintiffs' claims, so long as that common
course of conduct by the defendant was purposefully directed at the
forum state. 319
Ultimately, courts considering the line between specific and
general jurisdiction in the aggregation context should confront the
reasons why a court in one state might adjudicate claims based on
injuries occurring both inside and outside that state. Although Justice
Alito's Bristol-Myers opinion deemed it insufficient that the California
and non-California plaintiffs "sustained the same injuries" or that the
California plaintiffs "can bring claims similar to those brought by the
nonresidents," 3 20 he did not consider the practical value of aggregating
related claims arising from the same underlying conduct. Permitting
broad aggregation would be rational due to the tangible benefit of (as
the Court said in Keeton) "efficiently litigating" the "issues and damage
claims" arising from a common course of conduct.
The argument is even stronger with respect to claims for
injunctive relief. It is more efficient to litigate in a single proceeding
claims seeking an injunction based on a particular policy, action, or
inaction. 321 In addition, aggregation permits the court to craft a uniform
order of prospective relief that avoids subjecting the defendant to
conflicting injunctive commands. 322 Thus, the rationality standard
developed here can address obstacles that personal jurisdiction might

Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) ("[T]he last sentence of § 1367(a) makes clear that the provision
grants supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving joinder or intervention of additional
parties.").
319. This notion finds further support in the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction that
some lower courts have endorsed. See 4A WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1069.7, at
341 (noting that pendent personal jurisdiction addresses the situation where "a defendant is
subject to personal jurisdiction for one or more claims asserted against it, but not as to another
claim or claims"). Under this Article's theory, pendent personal jurisdiction would be a subset of
the wider category of cases where a defendant has established the basic level of minimum contacts
with the forum state and there is a rational basis for the forum to adjudicate the availability of
judicial remedies against that defendant.
320. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781, 1782 (2017).
321. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362-63 (2011) (stating that "[w]hen a
class seeks an indivisible injunction benefitting all its members at once" it is "self-evident" that a
"class action is a superior method of adjudicating the dispute").
322. See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 853-54, 860 (2016)
(describing how Rule 23(b)(1)(A) permits mandatory class actions to avoid "a risk of inconsistent
judgments" in cases involving prospective decrees and how Rule 23(b)(2) permits mandatory class
actions in cases seeking "system-wide" injunctive relief as to which "all class members can rely on
the resulting injunction or declaration").
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create for nationwide classes seeking nationwide injunctions based on
a defendant's common course of conduct. 323
C. Beyond Rationality
The theory described in the preceding sections of this Part is not
the exclusive basis for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
A forum that satisfies the Supreme Court's newly restrictive test for
general jurisdiction would have personal jurisdiction over a defendant
notwithstanding a lack of remedial rationality. 324 When a defendant is
''essentially at home"-even under the Court's very narrow definition of
that concept-jurisdiction can be justified by the traditional principle
that a defendant is subject to jurisdiction in his or her state of "domicile"
or "citizenship." 3 2 5
The same might hold true for transient or "tag" jurisdiction.
Such jurisdiction is controversial precisely because it is hard to square
with any dispute-related rationale. When the Supreme Court last
addressed transient jurisdiction in 1990, however, a four-Justice
plurality concluded that "its validation is its pedigree." 326 The other
four-Justice coalition found that tag jurisdiction satisfied an
"independent inquiry into [its] fairness," 3 2 7 based in part on the
defendant's "avail[ment] . . . of significant benefits provided by the

State" while voluntarily present within its borders: "His health and
safety are guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and emergency medical
services; he is free to travel on the State's roads and waterways; he
likely enjoys the fruits of the State's economy as well." 32 8 What was
ultimately dispositive for the concurrence, however, was "the fact that
American courts have announced the rule for perhaps a century," which

323. See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text. Regarding both monetary and
injunctive relief, this approach would make it unnecessary for courts to treat class actions
differently from other forms of aggregation, such as "mass actions," where large numbers of
individually named plaintiffs join together in a single action. See supra note 178 (discussing the
disagreement among lower courts about the applicability of Bristol-Myers to class actions).
Because the required "affiliation" for purposes of specific jurisdiction would be the rational
connection between the defendant's conduct and the forum state, this understanding would justify
a specific jurisdiction analysis regardless of whether aggregation occurred through a class action
or some other procedural mechanism.
324. See supra notes 56-61, 263-264 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ("As in case of the authority of the
United States over its absent citizens, the authority of a state over one of its citizens is not
terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state." (citation omitted)).
326. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (plurality opinion).
327. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
328. Id. at 637-38 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
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in turn "provides a defendant voluntarily present in a particular State
today 'clear notice that [he] is subject to suit' in the forum."3 29
Jurisdiction based on a defendant's consent or waiver might also
be justified by notions other than remedial rationality. 330 This could
include jurisdiction based on a defendant's registration to do business
in the forum state, at least in cases where the relevant state law deems
such registration to constitute consent to general jurisdiction. 3 3 1
Whether jurisdiction can be based on corporate registration statutes
alone, however, has been a contentious question. 332 As with transient
jurisdiction, it can conceivably permit jurisdiction even in cases where
there is no dispute-related rationale for the case to proceed in the
particular forum. Yet it is arguably supported by the defendant's ex
ante consent to such jurisdiction. 333
Interestingly, these situations where personal jurisdiction exists
despite a lack of remedial rationality find their legitimacy in
pre-International Shoe jurisdictional notions. Jurisdiction based on
domicile, in-forum service, and consent remain viable (though hardly
free from criticism 334) for reasons other than the new jurisdictional
conduit that InternationalShoe endorsed. The solution to the access-tojustice concerns discussed in this Article, however, will come from a
clearer understanding of International Shoe itself: a defendant's
minimum contacts with the forum state can justify specific jurisdiction
when there is a rational basis for the forum to adjudicate theavailability of judicial remedies in that particular case. 3 3 5
329. Id. at 636-37 (alteration in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
330. See 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1067.3, at 456 ("[Plersonal
jurisdiction can be based on the defendant's consent to have the case adjudicated in the forum, or
the defendant's waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense."); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 733 (1877) (noting that jurisdiction is proper in cases "in which that mode of service may be
considered to have been assented to in advance").
331. See 4A WRIGHT, MILLER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, § 1069.2, at 220-23 (noting that some
recent decisions on this issue have hinged on whether state law does, in fact, deem registration to
constitute consent to general jurisdiction).
332. See Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of
Consent, 36 CARDozo L. REV. 1343, 1359-71 (2015) (reviewing state corporate registration statutes
and arguing that corporate registration should not equate to consent to jurisdiction); Preis, supra
note 2, at 130-32 (reviewing the split among lower courts regarding whether corporate registration
amounts to consent for personal jurisdiction).
333. See, e.g., Senju Pharm. Co. v. Metrics, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 428, 438 (D.N.J. 2015)
(upholding jurisdiction based on the defendant's registration to do business in the forum state and
rejecting the argument that Daimler foreclosed general jurisdiction because "the present
situation ... principally concerns establishing jurisdiction through consent to service").
334. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 267, at 21-22 (calling transient jurisdiction "one of the
most exorbitant state court jurisdictional devices"); Monestier, supra note 332, at 1347 (criticizing
the idea that registration to do business in the forum state constitutes consent).
335. See supra Sections IV.A-IV.B.
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CONCLUSION

Establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a crucial
first step for injured parties wishing to obtain access to judicial
remedies. The Supreme Court's renewed interest in this topic prompts
important questions about the particular ways that the rules governing
personal jurisdiction can undermine access to justice. This Article has
identified three particular areas of concern: (1) the home-state scenario,
where a plaintiff is injured in her home state, relevant events occur in
her home state, and she seeks remedies from an out-of-state defendant
in the courts of her home state; (2) the safety-net scenario, where
alternative forums are unavailable or inadequate; and (3) the
aggregationscenario, where proceeding in a single forum is necessary
for effective adjudication of claims arising from a common course of
conduct.
Although the Supreme Court's recent decisions impose some
new obstacles to personal jurisdiction, they need not be read to
undermine access to judicial remedies and the enforcement of
substantive law. A sensible approach to minimum contacts-combined
with a rational basis standard for evaluating whether a specific
jurisdiction analysis applies-can make sense of the current case law,
clarify the overall doctrinal structure, and keep the courthouse doors
open.

